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INTRODUCTION 
 
The conflict between our duties as citizens and loyalties as family 
members is relatively uncharted in legal scholarship, especially with respect 
to how this tension manifests itself within the criminal justice system. Re-
cently, some scholars have begun to pay greater attention to such matters; 
for instance, in a recent book, Dan Markel, Ethan Leib, and Jennifer Collins 
have examined state policies that treat criminal defendants better because of 
their family ties and also impose extra burdens on account of familial sta-
tus.1 In this Article, I want to examine a different aspect of defendants’ fam-
ily ties: How do jurors use empathy to form judgments of capital defend-
ants’ family members, and how do cultural norms of family life affect the 
way jurors make sense of what happened during a murder? 
I was first drawn to this area of research while assessing how the sur-
vivors and victims’ family members of the Oklahoma City Bombing con-
fronted Timothy McVeigh, Terry Nichols, and Michael Fortier, the three 
White male conspirators involved in that case. While McVeigh was per-
ceived by many as a desperate loner who had no relationships with women, 
Nichols and Fortier were married with children, though each man’s family 
life was far from perfect.2 Nichols was divorced from his first wife and had 
married a Filipino mail-order bride for his second, and by many accounts 
was very controlling and misogynistic.3 Fortier and his wife were both drug 
addicts and/or dealers.4  
Family ties played key roles in the prosecutions of both defendants; 
they motivated Fortier to accept his plea bargain and formed a central pillar 
of Nichol’s sentencing arguments. For Fortier, cooperating and agreeing to 
a plea bargain could allow his attorney to “negotiate a deal to salvage some 
of his life with his family,” while refusing would mean that “he could be 
  
 1. See generally DAN MARKEL, JENNIFER M. COLLINS & ETHAN J. LEIB, PRIVILEGE 
OR PUNISH: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES (2009). 
 2. See Gordon Witkin & Karen Roebuck, Terrorist or Family Man? Terry Nichols 
Goes on Trial for the Oklahoma City Bombing, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 6, 1997, at 
24-25. 
 3. See Lois Romano, Nichols Defense Rests Its Case After Jury Hears More from 
Wife, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1997, at A02. 
 4. Tom Kenworthy & Lois Romano, Nichols Prosecutor Cites ‘Avalanche of Evi-
dence’; Closing Arguments Underway in Bombing Trial; Defense Paints Star U.S. Witness 
as Drug User, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1997, at A08; Karen Abbott & Lynn Bartels, Jones 
Attacks Fortier’s Story, Admitted Drug Dealer Changed His Testimony to Suit Prosecutors, 
McVeigh’s Lawyer Says, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 14, 1997, available at 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-67661606.html; Maurice Possley, McVeigh Jury Begins 
Its Deliberations, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 31, 1997, available at http://articles. 
chicagotribune.com/1997-05-31/news/9705310121_1_timothy-mcveigh-lori-fortier-district-
judge-richard-matsch. 
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executed by lethal injection, leaving his child fatherless.”5 Journalists knew 
that Fortier’s daughter Kayla was his “soft spot.”6 Defense attorney Michael 
Tigar characterized Nichols as McVeigh’s foil, a man who “baked bread, 
raised fawns, and received a hardship discharge from the Army in order to 
care for his 7-year-old son.”7 At Nichols’s sentencing, “friends and relatives 
told how he made flash cards and greeting cards for his children out of the 
file folders and toothpaste he was given in prison.”8 On one hand, the de-
fendants’ statuses as husbands and fathers demonstrated their ability to enter 
into an intimate human relationship, humanizing them. On the other hand, it 
made it more mystifying why these men became involved in the bombing—
they had so much more to lose than McVeigh. 
If there is a case with contrasting stereotypes of defendant’s family 
lives, it is that of Lee Boyd Malvo who, together with accomplice John Al-
len Muhammad (who had himself grown up without parents), engaged in a 
cross-country sniper killing spree.9 Malvo, who once called Muhammad 
father, was an “obedient teenager who killed at Muhummad’s command,” a 
child without a family of his own.10 During their killing spree, the two posed 
as father and son.11 According to expert psychological testimony at his trial, 
family instability could have made Malvo more vulnerable to brainwashing 
by Muhammad (implying that this was not a family of choice); he had en-
dured a fractured “childhood in which his mother often dropped out of his 
life.”12 According to news reports, after Malvo’s father abandoned him as a 
  
 5. David Willman, Oklahoma City Bomb Blew Fortier onto Razor’s Edge; Profile: 
Tied to the Two Prime Suspects, Arizonan now Faces a Grave Choice. How did He Come to 
this Crossroads?, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-06-04/news/mn-
13490_1_oklahoma-city. 
 6. See id. 
 7. Witkin & Roebuck, supra note 2. 
 8. Sandy Shore, Testimony Ends in Nichols Case; Defense Tries to Sway Jurors as 
Sentencing Phase of Trial Nears Closure, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 3, 1998, at 6A. 
 9. See Stephen Manning, Malvo Sentenced to Life for 6 Maryland Sniper Shoot-
ings, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 8, 2006, http://poststar.com/news/article_d4514a6b-3f02-
53ca-ae33-19fecde5197e.html. 
 10. Younger of Two Snipers Gets Life Term in Maryland, Associated Press, Nov. 9, 
2006, available at http://tucsoncitizen.com/morgue/2006/11/09/32076-younger-of-two-
snipers-gets-life-term-in-maryland/.  
 11. Adam Liptak, First Sniper Trial Heartens Defense for the Second, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 8, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/08/us/first-sniper-trial-heartens-
defense-for-the-second.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (stating that Malvo and Muhammad 
referred to one another as “father and son”). 
 12. See Steve Helber, Sniper Suspect’s Behavior Scrutinized for Sanity, USA 
TODAY, Dec. 5, 2003, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-12-05-malvo-trial_x.htm.  
Part of this indoctrination allegedly occurred when Malvo and Muhammad would play mili-
tary-themed video games together, in which soldiers performed heroic missions, as well as 
through the movie “The Matrix,” in which the hero redefined society under the guidance of 
his mentor. Id. 
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young boy, his mother allegedly took him with her from “town to town and 
school to school as she looked for work in the Caribbean, leaving her son 
with a string of people who were willing to take him in,” never leaving him 
with anyone for very long for fear he would form close emotional ties with 
others.13 Malvo’s aunt described this fatherlessness as a trend that was a 
family curse, telling Newsweek, “We don’t know what is father love.”14 
Eventually, his mother traveled to Florida and left Malvo behind in their 
rented “shack” in Antigua, where he met Muhammad and began the rela-
tionship that would lead to life without parole.15  
The cases of Nichols and Fortier on the one hand and Malvo on the 
other present two very different images of family life. Nichols and Fortier 
both lived with their current wives and children up until their arrests, and 
actively worked to maintain familial relationships from prison.16 Malvo, 
however, was the product of an altogether different family—one abandoned 
by a Black father and headed, if at all, by a Black female who was largely 
absent—which purportedly left him vulnerable to Muhummad’s destructive 
paternal mentoring.17 Both of these family types—the intact, White, emo-
tionally supportive family and the broken, Black matriarchal family—are 
omnipresent constructions in contemporary mainstream popular culture. 
According to cultural stereotypes, Malvo’s family is the type of family that 
violent Black male criminals “should” have, and jurors might expect a capi-
tal defendant’s family history to resemble Malvo’s more than Nichols’s.18  
This Article makes several contributions to the existing literature. It 
reveals how and why defendants’ childhoods and images of defendants’ 
families have profound significance; jurors want to know what sort of life 
history can produce someone who commits terrible crimes, and they are 
more comfortable when they can confirm that murderers are the products of 
abysmal childhoods and not born into families with “normal” home lives. It 
demonstrates that the perceptions we as citizens and as jurors form of capi-
  
 13. Matthew Barakat, Cult Expert Testifies for Malvo Defense, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Dec. 6, 2003, http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reload 
EntirePage=true 
 14. Kevin Peraino et al., Father, Where Art Thou?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 27, 2003, 
available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2003/01/27/father-where-art-thou. 
html. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Sandy Shore, Testimony Ends in Nichols Case; Defense Tries to Sway Jurors as 
Sentencing Phase of Trial Nears Closure, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 3, 1998, 6A (dis-
cussing how Nichols sent his children cards from prison); Tom Kenworthy, McVeigh Attor-
ney Skewers Government Witness as Lying Drug User, WASH. POST., May 1, 1997, A17. 
 17. See Bakarat, supra note 13. 
 18. These expectations could be based upon any number of interdependent sources 
such as jurors’ conscious or subconscious biases, or social science research connecting 
childhood socioeconomic deprivation, abuse, and neglect upon future criminal behavior. See 
infra Section II.C and note 195. 
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tal defendants are often significantly influenced by their family members 
and histories, and the similarities and differences between “us” and “them.” 
While jurors may try to put themselves in the shoes of both Nichols and 
Malvo, they empathically engage with each defendant in different ways 
according to his family dynamics. Because there is great disparity in how 
jurors may make sense of and apply these stereotypes in capital sentencing 
proceedings, this Article proposes that evidence about the defendant’s past 
and current family life that conflicts with or reinforces stereotypes may ag-
gravate more than it mitigates. Finally, it presents new qualitative research 
that is a first step towards assessing how jurors might comprehend and ap-
ply mitigating evidence of a defendant’s family life and history.  
This Article argues that empathy and its role in capital sentencing, in 
particular capital jurors’ reception of mitigating evidence from or about 
defendant’s family members, is frequently misunderstood, and its im-
portance underappreciated. Part I critically explores the nature of empathy, 
its contributions to jurors’ mitigation decisions, and the connection between 
empathic engagement and social perception within capital mitigation. Part II 
describes two distinct stereotypical constructions of families that are highly 
visible in contemporary mainstream culture, politics, and policy: the ideal-
ized “normal” White, middle-class family and the “dysfunctional” Black 
family. It then assesses how these particular stereotypes can hinder as well 
as help jurors’ reception of mitigation evidence and ability to form empathic 
connections. In Part III, this Article describes existing and original quantita-
tive and qualitative empirical research on how jurors form perceptions of 
defendants’ families, and what types of perceptions they are likely to form. 
This data suggest that jurors tend to view “normal” families in line with 
idealized White, middle-class family constructs and “dysfunctional” fami-
lies as its opposite. It also demonstrates that the quality of the emotional 
connections within a defendant’s family play a key role in jurors’ assess-
ments of that family (i.e., parents are faulted if they did not provide an emo-
tionally supportive environment for children or are not providing support 
during trial). This research suggests that capital defense attorneys should 
develop a more sophisticated understanding of how jurors assess infor-
mation from or about the defendant’s family and underscores the need for 
further research in this area. Finally, in Part IV, this Article discusses possi-
ble strategies by which capital defenders may identify and manage jurors’ 
comprehension of and reliance upon constructions of family life. Through-
out, this Article focuses most heavily on jurors and defendants who are 
Black and White; the bulk of empirical data and research addresses these 
two racial groups, and accordingly future work will need to probe the com-
plexities of other racial and ethnic groups. 
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I. EMPATHY, EMOTION, AND CAPITAL MITIGATION 
A.  Empathy’s Emotional Role 
Many legal scholars have recognized that, in the words of Clare Hun-
tington, “emotion is interwoven into every aspect of our lives—the trading 
floor, the classroom, the playing field, the street, the courthouse, the kitchen 
table.”19 Without emotion, humans cannot make appropriate decisions, fol-
low social norms, or lead productive lives.20 Emotion’s influence is felt not 
just by individuals but also within social units, including families. Though it 
is easy to stereotype emotion’s role in family life, the emotional landscape 
of any given family is not simplistically “either solidaristic and altruistic, 
filled with love and care, or, conversely, . . . filled with anger and jealousy, 
leading to violence and danger.”21 Moreover, the family is emotionally per-
formative, performing in society by providing for dependents and express-
ing emotion and performing for society by acting in ways thought to be 
situationally and socially appropriate to onlookers.22 According to Hunting-
ton, in both performative “contexts, emotion is the currency of the perfor-
mance, making it salient.”23 
What exactly is empathy, and what is its relationship to emotion? So-
cial scientists and legal academics are accustomed to use what C. Wright 
Mills termed the “sociological imagination” when seeking to understand 
those who are different.24 As I use it here, empathy is “a mode of sociality 
through which various dispositions, orientations, encounters, and actions 
materialize or fail to materialize amid specific sets of cultural conditions.”25 
It relates to our interpersonal need to explain others’ behavior and to com-
municate that understanding.26 Empathy is not so much a judgment of con-
nection or disconnection with others, but an evaluative process that, like so 
many other human processes, is instinctual and aspirational but partial and 
imperfect.27 “[I]nstead of an immediate response to environmental stimuli, it 
  
 19. Clare Huntington, Embracing the Affective Family, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 
321, 321 (2010). 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 321-22. 
 22. Id. at 323. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Michelle Brown, Unchosen Relationships at the Site of Injury: Empathy, Fail-
ure, and Criminology 1 (March 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Nancy Sherman, Empathy and Imagination, in 21 MIDWEST STUDIES IN 
PHILOSOPHY 82, 84 (1998). 
 27. Brown, supra note 24, at 2. 
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is an appraisal of such stimuli, and as an assessment, ‘may be modified by 
reappraisal of the environment in other ways.’”28  
Empathy allows us to both gauge others’ emotions and develop new 
emotional landscapes. The attraction of an empathic connection is interper-
sonal difference, which is always present; “I” am never “you.”29 Humans 
see others in certain situations and wish to attempt to place ourselves in 
their shoes. These “others” may be sentimentalized bodies—bodies in pain, 
or bodies in tragic predicaments of their own or others’ making—to whom 
we are emotionally drawn, whether in sympathy or in horror.30 These senti-
mentalized bodies are by nature different, bodies marked by misfortune and 
thus distinct from a population that does not customarily find themselves in 
such states of affairs, bodies that invite others to attempt to encounter and 
respond because of their unfortunate or terrible differences. Yet, these same 
tragic circumstances prompt others to attempt to encounter and respond to 
sentimentalized bodies, to understand, assess, judge, alleviate, or even ag-
gravate their suffering. Sentimentalized bodies thus prompt empathy 
pangs⎯the urge to encounter another who is different and to overcome in-
terpersonal discontinuities, if only temporarily.31 
Empathy requires both imagination and narrative. When we place our-
selves in another’s shoes, we attempt to approximate an experience.32 Imag-
ination’s power and empathic efficacy lies in the fact that it allows us to 
expand both our experiential horizons and emotional repertoire, enabling us 
to grasp so much more than what is apparent from our own immediate expe-
rience and environment.33 But imagination is ungrounded and need not be 
tethered to any reality.34 Consequentially, there is always a large gap be-
tween our imaginings and our ability to reconstruct what we imagined for 
others, and so we must be satisfied with approximate understandings.35 In 
order to ensure that our imaginings are readily comprehensible to others, we 
must tie them to a specific social context, setting limits around our imagina-
tive processes so that we may describe a particular imagined construction to 
  
 28. Jody Lyneé Madeira, Lashing Reason to the Mast: Understanding Judicial Con-
straints on Emotion in Personal Injury Litigation, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 141 (2006) 
[hereinafter Madeira, Mast] (quoting NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK 
AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS 72 (2001)). 
 29. Jody Lyneé Madeira, Recognizing Odysseus’ Scar: Reconceptualizing Pain and 
its Empathic Role in Civil Adjudication, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 41, 80 (2006) [hereinafter 
Madeira, Scar]. 
 30. Id. at 80 (quoting ALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAW 192-93 (1997)).  
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 88. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. 
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others who can then assess its appropriateness or rationality.36 Social prac-
tice enables us to ground imagination; our perceptions of whether an imag-
ined construction is realistic, accurate, proper, or nonsensical is informed by 
personal and cultural memory, which offer a repertoire of experiences with 
which we may compare the construction in question.37  
Narrative, the most highly structured form of expressive social prac-
tice, is also necessary to make our empathic encounters real and meaning-
ful.38 As “trajectories plotted upon material reality by our imagination,”39 
narratives explain what social practices are relevant and why, triggering 
certain cultural memories.40 We need detail and context before attempting to 
empathically encounter another’s experience, and other forms of social 
practice may not provide all that we need.41 Through narrative, social prac-
tice organizes our imaginings, matching them with others already familiar to 
us and allowing us to orient ourselves while assessing others’ experiential 
claims.42 As communicators, we extend ourselves into the world to encoun-
ter, and to express and perform our own experiences, states, and identities; 
as interpreters, we take the external world with us in our imagined journey 
into another’s interior.43 When we find another’s claims inaccessible or un-
believable, this means that that other’s experience has no accessible parallel 
within our social practice.44 On such empathic journeys, we are left rudder-
less, with only imagination as our guide. These experiences are interperson-
ally unrecognizable.45 
Processes of empathy may themselves be narratives that are more or 
less complete, depending on the strength of an empathic connection. At the 
beginning of an empathic narrative, one is confronted with another who 
implicitly or explicitly makes an experiential claim that serves as an em-
pathic trigger, sparking a desire to place one’s self in that person’s shoes, to 
form an empathic connection to assess this experiential claim.46 If the claim 
resonates with the empathizer’s social practice, it becomes comprehensible 
and credible; it if does not, it is deemed incomprehensible or incredible.47 
But this is not the end of the empathic narrative; one may not only reach an 
  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 90.  
 39. Id. (quoting Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, 
AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 5 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1995)). 
 40. Id. at 88. 
 41. Id. at 88-89. 
 42. Id. at 88. 
 43. Id. at 89. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 90. 
 47. Id. 
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approximate understanding of another’s experiential claim, but can engage 
with that claim on a deeper level.48 In this more profound engagement, we 
not only realize that another is undergoing a certain experience, but we 
acknowledge that we are somehow changed by that realization as well.49 
Perhaps this change comes about through a felt connection with another; 
perhaps it arrives with a radical rejection of that other.50 This profound em-
pathic experience can actually become an emotion that takes as its object 
the person with whom we are empathically engaged; the nature of that emo-
tion constitutes a subjective positive or negative evaluation of that individu-
al.51 We may judge the person to be similar to us, long to do something for 
or to that individual, or feel an empathic responsibility for her.  
To illustrate this process of empathic engagement, let us imagine that 
jurors are presented with a picture of a middle-aged woman who was con-
victed of a terrible crime: killing a younger woman when she was nine 
months pregnant—nearly at term—and cutting the victim’s infant from her 
womb to pass off as her own child. Jurors are told that the perpetrator has 
claimed that she always wanted an infant but was infertile, and that she de-
cided to take such violent measures out of desperation because she did not 
know any other way to get a child. This convicted woman is a sentimental-
ized body—someone who has set herself apart from society through a terri-
bly violent act—and jurors may be tempted to place themselves in her shoes 
to assess why on earth someone would or could behave in this fashion. This 
attempt to evaluate her actions and reasoning—to encounter her as an indi-
vidual—is the empathic process.  
Thereafter, our own experiential repertoires will inform our subjective 
evaluations. If jurors themselves have had difficulty conceiving a child or 
experienced miscarriage, they may recall experiencing anger or jealousy at 
the sight of pregnant strangers meandering past them at the grocery store or 
in the park. Or they may recall the emotional experience of desperately 
yearning for something (not necessarily a child) that seems out of reach. 
They may thus come to understand how the perpetrator “must have felt” 
prior to the murder.  
But when jurors attempt to move beyond assessing this woman’s emo-
tional state to identify with and thus evaluate her violent actions, they will 
be unable to credit her claim that cutting another woman’s child out of her 
murdered corpse was the only solution. They are likely to think of many 
other options that are not only legal and socially permissible, but actually 
encouraged, such as adoption or becoming a foster parent. In short, although 
jurors have empathically “connected” with this perpetrator—put themselves 
  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 90-91. 
 51. Id. at 91. 
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in what they imagine to be her shoes—they would evaluate her motivations 
and choices negatively and would reject her justification for committing the 
murder. Ultimately, they may reject her position so strongly that they not 
only fail to credit her claims, but view her as monstrous or evil—
determinations that, in turn, reinforce the propriety of our assessments of 
what we would have done in her position. Deeming her monstrous or evil, 
in other words, can buttress jurors’ cherished self-conceptions, such as their 
tendency to see themselves as peaceful, law-abiding citizens.  
Of course, jurors’ recollections of our experiences and understandings 
of social practices can be flawed in a variety of ways, such as ethnocen-
trism, bias, or prejudice. Whether they operate overtly or covertly, these 
factors can warp processes of empathic identification. According to Lynch, 
subtle prejudice (or “modern racism”), though connected to racial stereotyp-
ing, is demonstrated not by explicitly applying negative qualities to “out-
group members” but instead by assigning positive attributes to “in-group 
members.”52 Social stereotypes set the groundwork for subtle prejudice by 
making available a ready stock of negative attributions and creating distance 
between social groups.53 It does not take much to activate these stereotypes, 
and research has shown that cultural stereotypes can still be triggered in 
“low-prejudice people” who do not condone them, particularly when these 
individuals “are busy, engaging in automatic thinking, distracted, and una-
ble to put effort into controlled thinking.”54 Mere familiarity with negative 
stereotypes is enough. Unfortunately, subtle prejudice is more covert and 
thus “more intractable than” earlier, more explicit forms of racism, and both 
stem from and reinforce social structures that purport to operate according 
to “fairness, entitlement, and other social values” but are actually engines of 
racial inequality.55  
B.  Emotion, Empathy, and Capital Mitigation 
Sometimes our empathic encounters with others may be influenced by 
other socially or institutionally-imposed evaluative roles, as in jury duty. 
We may feel an urge to empathically place ourselves in the shoes of a con-
victed murderer as members of a news audience, but we may be under a 
duty to sentence this offender as members of the jury. There is little doubt 
that empathy plays a crucial role in capital sentencing.56 We might even go 
  
 52. Mona Lynch, Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Life-and-Death Decision Making: 
Lessons from Laypersons in an Experimental Setting, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING 
STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 185 (Charles J. Ogletree & Austin Sarat eds., 2006). 
 53. Id. at 184-85. 
 54. SUNWOLF, PRACTICAL JURY DYNAMICS: FROM ONE JUROR’S TRIAL PERCEPTIONS 
TO THE GROUP’S DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 164 (2004). 
 55. Lynch, supra note 52, at 187. 
 56. Id. at 189. 
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further and say that capital sentencing itself is an empathic task, at least if 
mitigating evidence is introduced; jurors must evaluate the credibility of 
that evidence as well as how it bears upon the defendant’s autonomy and 
deserved sentence, and likely will form empathic connections in the pro-
cess.  
Focusing upon the empathic dimensions of capital mitigation also re-
affirms empathy’s roles within and contributions to law and criminology. 
Empathy occurs at a site of injury or in a moment of crisis, when it is par-
ticularly crucial for us to seek to understand or rationalize not only what has 
happened, but why—indeed, the “why” is a central part of the “what.” As 
Brown asserts, criminology is uniquely positioned to study moments where 
we seek to connect empathically with offenders and their family members—
it studies “injury, harm, and pain” and so can access empathic connections 
in “those instances of social experience where human connection, under-
standing, and social knowing are destroyed, avoided, prohibited, or simply 
impossible.”57 In addition, both law and criminology are “about the way that 
humans find themselves in the midst of unchosen relationships, sites with 
little room for shared feeling or emotional attunement, that, nonetheless, 
impose an ethical responsibility on the individual and the collective.”58 In 
both criminal justice and law, empathic connections are most often rooted in 
judgment, a context that profoundly colors the empathic connection that is 
formed—rendering it difficult to obtain any “empathy that is curious, en-
gaged, authentic, committed, and flexible.”59  
Legal scholars such as Susan Bandes, Terry Maroney, and Austin 
Sarat have demonstrated that emotion and emotional processes are central to 
stories of crime and punishment and the lives that they shape.60 Empathy 
may serve as a medium for emotions and their relationship to a sense of 
justice, and it has both positive and negative attributes that need to be more 
thoroughly investigated and worked through in this particular context.61 For 
instance, empathy often implies favoring the legal party thought to be most 
like one’s self or with whom one most closely identifies, which may result 
  
 57. Brown, supra note 24, at 2. 
 58. Id. at 4. 
 59. Id. at 2. 
 60. See, e.g., AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND 
THE AMERICAN CONDITION (2002); Susan A. Bandes, Repellent Crimes and Rational Delib-
eration: Emotion and the Death Penalty, 33 VT. L. REV. 489 (2009); Susan A. 
Bandes, Victims, “Closure,” and the Sociology of Emotion, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 
(2009); Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of 
Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599, 1604-05 (2000); Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narra-
tive, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 405 (1996); Terry 
Maroney, Emotional Competence, “Rational Understanding,” and the Criminal Defend-
ant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1375 (2006).  
 61. Brown, supra note 24, at 3. 
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in a biased perspective.62 “Empathy may align with violence [or] venge-
ance”; it may occur in moderation or excess to the point of immersion in 
another.63 If attempts at empathic connection fail to approximate the lived 
experiences of vulnerability and victimization, it can result in the dehuman-
ization of the defendant or the victim.64 Finally, empathy can arise from 
unsavory motives such as voyeurism or taking pleasure in others’ pain.65 
The challenge, as Brown frames it, is to rely upon empathy to cultivate good 
judgment and deliberative decision making.66 Thus, she calls for the devel-
opment of an “empathically-attuned criminology” that assesses how best to 
generate “a truly imaginative empathy with multiple, culturally contingent 
meanings.”67 
Jurors entering capital sentencing proceedings realize that the defend-
ant has already been convicted of a murderous criminal act, which is scarce-
ly a sympathetic position.68 Prosecutorial narratives explain how a capital 
defendant’s crime is a product of his free will and unhampered autonomy 
and attempt to reduce the defendant to this murderous act.69 Defense mitiga-
tion narratives are purportedly vehicles for explaining why a defendant did 
not act with full autonomy or why the defendant’s bad act is atypical, creat-
ing sufficient juror empathy to save the defendant’s life.70 Capital sentenc-
ing proceedings (and, in fact, all sentencing proceedings in serious criminal 
cases) should be unique empathic forums not only because they call for 
empathy’s narrative expression in the form of mitigation, but also because 
they bring before jurors a convicted defendant who has allegedly been 
marked by terrible and painful life experiences or agency-altering injuries 
and require jurors to confront a painful phenomenological question—how 
the defendant’s prior experiences or injuries should bear upon his responsi-
bility for later actions.71  
The U.S. Supreme Court and other federal and state courts have rou-
tinely held that common mitigation evidence includes information on a de-
fendant’s family history, especially evidence of prior child abuse, neglect, 
abandonment, and family dysfunction.72 To uncover such details, capital 
  
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. at 21. 
 65. Id. at 17. 
 66. Sherman, supra note 26, at 90. 
 67. Brown, supra note 24, at 4. 
 68. Lynch, supra note 52, at 189-90. 
 69. Craig Haney, Evolving Standards of Decency: Advancing the Nature and Logic 
of Capital Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 842-43 (2008). 
 70. Lynch, supra note 52, at 190. 
 71. Madeira, Mast, supra note 28, at 141-42. 
 72. According to the Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of De-
fense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, (Rule 2.2(a)(ii)): 
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defenders and mitigation experts delve deeply into defendants’ family back-
grounds73 in a thorough manner that “exposes raw nerves, re-traumatizes, 
scratches at the scars nearest the client’s heart.”74 According to Craig 
Haney, capital defenders alternate between “the construction of a psycho-
  
Mitigation evidence includes, but is not limited to, compassionate factors stem-
ming from the diverse frailties of humankind, the ability to make a positive ad-
justment to incarceration, the realities of incarceration and the actual meaning of a 
life sentence, capacity for redemption, remorse, execution impact, vulnerabilities 
related to mental health, explanations of patterns of behavior, negation of aggravat-
ing evidence regardless of its designation as an aggravating factor, positive acts or 
qualities, responsible conduct in other areas of life (e.g., employment, education, 
military service, as a family member), any evidence bearing on the degree of moral 
culpability, and any other reason for a sentence less than death. 
Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty 
Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 679 (2008); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 
115 (1982) (holding that “[e]vidence of a difficult family history and of emotional disturb-
ance is typically introduced by defendants in mitigation” and “there can be no doubt that 
evidence of a turbulent family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe emotional 
disturbance is particularly relevant”); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating “that defendants who commit criminal acts that are at-
tributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less 
culpable than defendants who have no such excuse”); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 
(1989) (stating that certain aspects of the defendant’s background, such as a history of abuse, 
must be given mitigating effect); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003) (stating that 
“[h]ad the jury been able to place petitioner’s excruciating life history on the mitigating side 
of the scale, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a dif-
ferent balance”); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (stressing the importance of a 
thorough life history investigation); Brewer v. Aiken, 935 F.2d 850, 857-58 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(finding counsel ineffective for not investigating and presenting evidence of defendant’s 
disadvantaged family life); Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding 
counsel ineffective for not humanizing defendant through testimony of the defendant’s fami-
ly); Collier v. Turpin, 177 F.3d 1184, 1202 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding counsel ineffective for 
not presenting evidence about his impoverished background and the fact that he was a good 
“family man”); Nance v. Ozmint, 626 S.E.2d 878, 883 (S.C. 2006) (finding counsel ineffec-
tive for not presenting evidence of defendant’s extreme childhood poverty and history of 
child abuse).  
 73. The commentary to Guideline 10.7 in the ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE 
APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES makes it 
clear that counsel’s duty to investigate includes “extensive and generally unparalleled inves-
tigation into personal and family history.” ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND 
PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 81, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/deathpenalty/resources/docs/2003Guidelines.pdf (quoting Russell 
Stetler, Capital Cases: Mitigation Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 
1999, at 35). 
 74. Stetler, supra note 73, at 36; see also Jeff Blum, Investigation in a Capital Case: 
Telling the Client’s Story, CHAMPION, Aug. 1985, at 30 (stating that family members will be 
reticent to discuss physical or sexual maltreatment by other family members); Helen G. 
Berrigan, The Indispensable Role of the Mitigation Specialist in a Capital Case: A View 
From the Federal Bench, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 819, 826 (2008) (stating that “[t]he defendant 
and family members have the firsthand information needed for an effective defense, but are 
often not forthcoming because the information is highly personal”). 
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logically oriented social history [in which] key developmental stages and 
relevant family and social experiences are analyzed together” and “[a] miti-
gating counter-narrative that incorporates a capital defendant’s social histo-
ry and immediate life circumstances.”75 These mitigation narratives are situ-
ated within and responsive to a larger account of the crime of which the 
defendant was convicted. The narrative of the defendant’s crime and the 
narrative of mitigating evidence position legal parties in diverse and chang-
ing roles. In the criminal narrative, the defendant is the one who acted vio-
lently, the victim the one whom he acted upon; in the mitigation narrative, 
the defendant might be the one injured, and a family member might step 
into the role of violent actor.  
It is the capital defense attorney’s goal to orchestrate empathy through 
effective mitigation narratives, persuading jurors that the defendant has suf-
fered a mitigating injury, that something can and must be done about that 
injury, and that another person properly bears some responsibility for that 
injury, rendering the defendant deserving of life. But for better or worse, an 
attorney’s efforts can only go so far; jurors will use a wide variety of cogni-
tive tools in order to evaluate these mitigation narratives. According to so-
cial cognition theory, we rely on mental shortcuts called schemas that are 
generated as we categorize and make sense of prior experience; when mak-
ing comparisons, we assess what past information (and schemas) are most 
similar to the present context, and then superimpose them upon the new 
information before us.76 Schemas may come from personal experience, cul-
tural knowledge or lore, and other sources. Scripts, a type of schema, help 
jurors evaluate the “sequence of events that happen across a period of time,” 
prompting them to expect that certain actions will occur in a certain order in 
a specific social context, such as disciplining a child for talking back or 
visiting a sit-down restaurant.77 Jurors also utilize role schemas to “organize 
their existing knowledge about what behaviors are appropriate to what so-
cial roles (mother, son, friend, sister, neighbor, priest)”; role schemas are 
activated when jurors “compare trial evidence about someone’s behavior in 
a social role, so a judgment can be made that it was normal or abnormal.”78  
Schemas are not merely useful evaluative tools; they are essential 
cognitive coping mechanisms for our hectic modern lives that allow us to 
make rapid judgments about what type of connection we feel to a new indi-
vidual (whether that person is a member of an in-group or out-group)79 and 
evaluate others’ behaviors by imagining how we would have behaved under 
  
 75. Haney, supra note 69, at 844. 
 76. SUNWOLF, supra note 54, at 188-89. 
 77. Id. at 188. 
 78. Id. at 188-89. 
 79. Id. at 126. 
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these circumstances.80 It is not surprising that capital mitigation narratives 
are designed to activate particular schemas or scripts that may persuade 
jurors that a defendant merits life and not death. Because such knowledge is 
acquired through cultural socialization, different racial groups within Amer-
ican society are familiar with mainstream (White) cultural schemas and 
constructs even if they do not endorse them (in fact, such awareness empha-
sizes the distinctions between mainstream White schemas and those of non-
White populations). Because capital juries have a distinctive composition as 
compared to juries in nondeath cases—“disproportionately white, male, 
older, and more religiously and politically conservative”—jurors might be 
most likely to endorse and apply mainstream White schemas.81  
But these mental shortcuts can also lead jurors down many paths that a 
defense attorney would wish to avoid. Schemas are the locus of prejudice; 
they shape, and perhaps distort, a juror’s memory, prompting the juror to 
store and recall those details consistent with the perspective chosen.82 
Through out-group homogenization, jurors may perceive all members of an 
out-group (i.e., all Blacks) as more similar and less variable than in-group 
members (i.e., all Whites).83 Under fundamental attribution error, jurors 
assume that their mistakes are caused by temporary factors, while others’ 
derive from permanent personality flaws; under false consensus error, jurors 
see their own choices and behaviors as typical and normal⎯what reasona-
ble people would do under the circumstances.84 Well-developed “schemas 
resist change and” become stronger over time as jurors use them “to imag-
ine an event, to explain how it might occur, or to consider how a judgment 
might be true.”85 First impressions matter enormously; schemas triggered 
early in a trial profoundly affect jurors’ later perceptions, information to 
which jurors are first exposed primes relevant schemas, and jurors’ catego-
rization of a new person affect subsequent interpretations of his behavior.86 
Suppression of problematic schemas, including prejudicial ones, is difficult 
and most often temporary, and when asked to put aside such experience or 
opinions, jurors will usually say that they can, yet will inevitably still be 
influenced by them.87 Finally, jurors may not have learned the social “costs” 
of holding a particular opinion or schema, making it easier to maintain.88  
  
 80. Id. at 135, 138. 
 81. Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Mapping the Racial Bias of the White Male Capi-
tal Juror: Jury Composition and the “Empathic Divide,” 45 L. & SOC’ Y REV. 69, 73 (2011).  
 82. SUNWOLF, supra note 54, at 130.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 139, 141. 
 85. Id. at 131. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 155, 162. 
 88. Id. at 133. 
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Schemas and their triggers are strung together within narratives, form-
ing stories of various length and complexity. In deliberation, jurors compare 
these trial stories to their own stories of personal experience, “insert[ing] 
their own lived events into deliberations, in an attempt to make sense of the 
trial evidence.”89 After analyzing jurors’ “natural storytelling” during delib-
erations in real cases, Sunwolf found that jurors referenced “common 
knowledge” stories about their own or others’ experiences, stories about 
how reasonable people would behave, and imaginative “what-if” or “if-
only” stories that placed jurors or others into trial events or in which trial 
events turned out differently than they actually did; jurors’ most common 
storying act was “imagining one of the trial participants in some event that 
the jurors knew did not actually take place.”90  
A brief perusal of any state capital defense manual illustrates a variety 
of specific ways in which capital defense attorneys can attempt to trigger 
jurors’ empathic identification. Mitigating narratives of family history might 
be used in a variety of ways; a capital defender may rely upon evidence of a 
defendant’s severely dysfunctional childhood to demonstrate his lack of 
capacity (as in Lee Boyd Malvo’s case), or introduce evidence of his current 
harmonious family relations to illustrate his humanity and the impact of his 
execution upon innocent others (as in Terry Nichols’s case). The Indiana 
Death Penalty Defense Manual, for instance, asserts that the “mistreatment 
of the defendant as a child or society’s failure to respond to his cries for 
help” make particularly powerful mitigating arguments because they help to 
establish that he is “not absolutely guilty.”91 The manual reminds public 
defenders that “one person’s mitigation might be another person’s aggrava-
tion” and advises them to use jury selection as an opportunity to “seek out 
from among those jurors the ones who are responsive to the mitigating fac-
tors that you intend to present and to expose those who are left cold by what 
you are suggesting is mitigation.”92 To these ends, attorneys can ask jurors 
revelatory questions such as, “Do you think that a person can go bad when 
his parents don’t give him discipline and attention?” or “Do you think that a 
parent shares the responsibility when his child goes bad if the parent hasn’t 
been giving discipline and attention?”93 The manual also reminds capital 
defenders of the importance of the defendant’s family’s trial attendance:  
[T]he presence of family and friends in the courtroom supporting the client can 
have a beneficial impact upon the jury. It is harder for the jury to return a verdict of 
death when it seems that the client has caring family and friends. Moreover, view-
  
 89. Id. at 269. 
 90. Id. at 272, 276, 282-83. 
 91. INDIANA PUBLIC DEFENDER COUNCIL, DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE VOL. 2, 7 § 4-
26. 
 92. Id. at 5 § 3-34. 
 93. Id. at 5 § 3-35. 
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ing the defendant’s family members day after day may make the jury begin to feel 
as sorry for them as they do for the victim’s family. It may also impress upon the 
jury the impact of a death sentence upon the client’s family and friends.94 
Finally, the manual underscores the importance of family testimony; 
for instance, a capital defender might “[p]ut on the defendant’s child and 
have the child talk about his father and their relationship. The child might 
ask the jury not to kill his father and take him away.”95 
The task of the defense attorney, then, is not merely to describe this 
mitigating evidence, but to construct the defendant as an empathic object. 
Defense attorneys craft narratives and stories triggering schemas and scripts 
they feel will be meaningful to jurors based on what they know or believe 
about the jurors’ cultural backgrounds and values. In this constructive pro-
cess, narratives of mitigating experiences or injuries must be recognized in 
their own right as mental illness or injury, as child abuse or neglect. When 
applied to the defendant and his life history, they may induce empathy, 
which makes the defendant’s body—a sentimentalized body—an object and 
may create a corresponding mitigating effect. Often this is accomplished by 
having family members testify:  
You will have to show that the defendant is loved by people just as the victim was 
loved. It is always best to have the family and friends testify anecdotally about in-
cidents in the defendant’s life. . . . Don’t hesitate to have the family and friends re-
veal negative things, such as a history of alcoholism and drug abuse. Also have the 
family and friends be prepared to admit that they have somehow contributed to the 
defendant’s conduct. . . . Many parents, realizing that their son or daughter may be 
executed[,] will admit that they abused their child physically and psychologically.96 
Thus, through mitigation narratives, defense attorneys construct the 
defendant and his relatives as analytic and agentic objects, empathic vessels 
to be produced and proffered to the jury as having the potential to allocate 
responsibility and alleviate or eliminate injustice.97  
Although we have been discussing empathy and mitigation in an emo-
tional context, most legal actors—particularly judges—see mitigation narra-
tives through the lens of evidence instead. In death penalty cases, the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly affirmed that the decision to impose the death 
penalty must be a “reasoned moral response . . . rather than an emotional 
one.”98 Here, emotion is not regarded as a component of moral judgments. 
Certain emotions—prejudicial emotions—may be privately felt but should 
not and cannot be publicly seen. Sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild has 
  
 94. Id. at 6 § 1.2-1.3. 
 95. Id. at 7 § 1-1. 
 96. Id. at 7 § 6-14-6-15. 
 97. These duties are similar to those of a personal injury attorney who tries to induce 
juror empathy for an injured plaintiff. See Madeira, Scar, supra note 29, at 92. 
 98. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 
U.S. 538, 545 (1987)). 
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documented how humans continuously manage their own emotions, dis-
playing some emotions that are felt, attempting to fake other emotions that 
are not felt, and endeavoring to suppress emotions judged inappropriate.99 
She has posited that emotional management decisions are governed by 
“feeling rules” established though private, individualized norms. In the 
courtroom, however, “feeling rules” most often consist of institutional pro-
scriptions that assert “emotion is dangerous . . . because it distorts percep-
tion and leads people to act irrationally.”100 
In effect, the rule of law creates its own emotional culture in which 
substantive legal norms are threatened by alternative values such as those of 
empathy. This differs from empathy’s openly acknowledged role in other 
lay social contexts like routine conversation, where empathic identification 
is a natural and rational interpersonal response—natural in that it is not con-
trived, and rational in that it emerges in a patterned and not a random man-
ner and is the predictable outcome of certain interactions. Indeed, in extra-
legal contexts, empathy is unavoidable because it is woven into the fabric of 
inter-subjectivity, and is thus a communicative norm. Empathic inter-
subjectivity is tied to the interpersonal human instinct to engage with and 
evaluate others’ experience. Current legal principles disfavoring empathy 
may be unrealistic because they curtail or altogether deny the power and 
play that the human empathic instinct has outside of law.101 Indeed, it is dif-
ficult to determine where evaluation of mitigation evidence stops and em-
pathic encounters triggered by that same evidence begin—empathic encoun-
ters are, after all, a way for jurors to evaluate the credibility of mitigating 
evidence. Nonetheless, in creating its own emotional culture and precisely 
defining the proper role of emotive response and of empathy, law enunci-
ates a code of moral worth that jurors must follow by adjudicating on the 
basis of evidence and not emotive response.102  
It is not necessarily improper for legal practice to place new con-
straints upon lay behaviors that are different from or even wholly alien to 
lay understanding. But it is also improbable to expect jurors to divest them-
selves of emotion and empathy at the courtroom door. Empathy is an inevi-
table part of capital judgment; in evaluating mitigation evidence, jurors 
must assess whether to acknowledge the defendant’s past suffering and 
come to an agreement on what consequences it should have. Moreover, sev-
eral routine occurrences in a capital trial—a capital defender’s assertion that 
the defendant has suffered in the past and is still affected by that prior trau-
ma, or a glimpse of a defendant’s relative crying in the gallery—are likely 
  
 99. ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
HUMAN FEELING 30 (2003). 
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 101. See Madeira, Mast, supra note 28, at 192-96. 
 102. Id. at 194. 
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to spark empathic identification. Thus, when jurors weigh mitigating evi-
dence, there must be a marriage, not a divorce, of legal and lay understand-
ings regarding empathy’s propriety.103  
Though most scholars have focused on how jurors form empathic en-
counters with defendants, jurors are also likely to empathically evaluate 
defendants’ family members.104 Defendants’ relatives are often present dur-
ing trial and may testify at sentencing; jurors are very likely to take notice 
of them and evaluate their behavior during trial and on the stand. They, like 
the defendant, victim, and victim’s family, demand notice and acknowl-
edgment, and their faces and bodies become displays that jurors not only 
watch, but to which they may want to respond. Though the defendant’s rela-
tives are most likely strangers with whom jurors feel they have little in 
common, jurors’ empathic connections with these individuals may be inte-
gral to their determinations of which sentence is most just. Thus, we should 
pay attention to how jurors encounter the painful, horrifying but very real 
lived worlds of defendants’ family members. 
What, then, is the relationship between empathy and mitigating evi-
dence that triggers or informs jurors’ empathic assessments of not only the 
defendant, but the defendant’s family, which is likely a family structure and 
lifestyle different from most jurors’ own families and upbringings? In order 
to answer this question more fully, we must understand how and why jurors 
come to idealize certain kinds of families, family structures or organiza-
tions, and values as “normal” and label others as deviant or dysfunctional.  
II. EMPATHY AND NORMATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF AMERICAN FAMILIES 
A.  Whiteness and Idealized Images of “Normal” White, Middle-Class  
Families 
White, middle-class family values remain the dominant reference 
point in today’s “mainstream” culture, and it is impossible to talk about 
White, middle-class (heterosexual) values without talking about White, 
middle-class families—the “stick against which all families are meas-
ured.”105 As one scholar asserts,  
It is not so much discussed as assumed that a family is supposed to be a variation 
on a productive marriage that features a husband, a wife, and children. That model 
long ago became a highly coercive ideal. Entering through the portal of collective 
  
 103. Id. at 192. 
 104. See infra Part III.  
 105. Karen Pyke, “The Normal American Family” as an Interpretive Structure of 
Family Life Among Grown Children of Korean and Vietnamese Immigrants, 62 J. MARRIAGE 
& FAM. 240, 240 (2000). 
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imagination, the idealized family permeates all aspects of the nation’s social life. It 
also penetrates shared structures of thought.106  
These values are assumed to have universal currency in contemporary 
American culture. Thus, in an episode of The Simpsons, when Homer asks 
his family to behave like “a nice, normal family at his company picnic,” the 
audience knows exactly what he means, and how a “normal” family should 
look and behave.107 We can discuss these values and the fictional, idealized 
family that exemplifies them using a variety of philosophical, sociological, 
anthropological, cognitive, and psychological discourses; we can term them 
images, myths, social constructions, shared cultural beliefs, cultural capital, 
class culture, cultural schemas, or stereotypes. Whatever terms one uses, 
these pervasive concepts have indirectly and directly shaped the real lives of 
millions, coding in hegemonic fashion how society normalizes and evalu-
ates certain ways in which humans live together. These and other cultural 
models provide structured expectations “about how the world is or should 
be,” and allow us to imagine a “world of ‘common sense’” featuring a uni-
versal and naturalized set of beliefs and an environment in which “prototyp-
ical events unfold wholly expectedly in a chain held together by shared as-
sumptions about both physical and psychological causality.”108  
Our family structures also serve as identity cues.109 As adults and chil-
dren, members of a society all engage in a collective project of attempting 
to communicate various elements of “who we are” as a family to outsiders. 
Mainstream culture supports this identity work for some families more than 
others; families resembling cultural ideals “see themselves reflected in 
many cultural representations and easily think of themselves as ordinary.”110  
Any discussion of White, middle-class families is incomplete without 
a discussion of “Whiteness,” a central concept in normative theories of 
American moral personhood. Whiteness is both “a moral and political cate-
gory . . . which requires both material practice and symbolic performance 
for its maintenance,” which until relatively recently, has passed without 
comment.111 Whiteness became a unifying identity following World War II, 
when light-skinned immigrants and their children began to congregate in 
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suburban neighborhoods, where ethnic labels such as “Italian” or “Polish” 
could be traded for the more universal category of “white-American.”112 
People of color, however, “were kept out of the suburbs by discriminatory 
mortgage packages, covenants on land purchases and a continuation of re-
strictive housing (and labour policies) which began in the 1920s and 
1930s.”113 They, like rural Whites, remained pathologized. Miller emphasiz-
es that the emigration from city to suburbia “probably always was and still 
is largely motivated by a desire to escape the mix of classes and racial and 
ethnic groups that characterize urban areas” as well as to take advantage of 
incentives that made owning a suburban home not only a smart investment, 
but part of the American dream.114 
Whiteness has played a key role in the construction of an idealized 
family structure; because members of the White middle-class have been the 
mainstream cultural myth-makers, “it is their imagination and fragmented 
perception that historically serve as the template for the American imagi-
nary family.”115 Though it has had very real effects upon social policy and 
individual lives, the White, middle-class American family is largely imagi-
nary—a socially constructed image that is the product of many other myths 
that historically have played important roles in American culture. It has 
been influenced by the antebellum model of “separate spheres,” which held 
that the home was the site of “moral, ethical and religious education” pro-
vided by the wife-mother, while the husband-father worked to provide for 
the family outside the home.116 Although it too was in a sense “imaginary,” 
Cassuto describes the separate spheres model as “a very powerful myth” 
with “a strong normative influence” that even now, 200 years later, “contin-
ues to drive the debate over ‘family values.’”117 
The construct of the idealized American family has also been heavily 
influenced by American sentimentalism, a movement in social thought that 
drew heavily upon the separate spheres model and emphasized feelings and 
emotions rather than logic and reason.118 Thanks to American sentimental-
ism, love became as important a factor in marriage as finances, and middle-
class Americans became concerned with others’ suffering and worked to 
end social ills such as slavery, child labor, and inhumane prison conditions. 
American sentimentalism has impacted men and women differently; while 
the “man of feeling” was once just as proper as the domestic and demure 
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wife-mother, towards the middle of the twentieth century the “man of feel-
ing” became the “man of action” as WWII-era America became more mas-
culine and began to fear and ridicule emotion in masculine, public 
spheres.119  
Contemporary images of the White, middle-class family were forged 
in the tidy ranch houses, manicured lawns, and picket fences of mid-
twentieth century suburbia—the scene of America’s “Golden Era,”120 the 
landscape of Baby Boomer childhood.121 Within this environment, families 
became the core unit of civilized (White) American society. Sociologists 
such as Talcott Parsons asserted that this family structure was ideal for ad-
aptation to the modern industrial economic system, with a husband/father 
“who managed the outside world and connected his children to the econom-
ic system” and a wife/mother who “was the expressive leader, who helped 
to protect Dad from the pressures of the economic world and manag[ed] the 
home front.”122  
Family structure was important for both civil defense and nation build-
ing; family failings were thought to lead to national crises. In these subur-
ban families, Stephanie Coontz asserts, women were supposed “to be sensi-
tive, understanding, patient, selfless and faithful,”123 rich in maternal love 
for their children and romantic love for their husbands.124 Yet they were also 
supposed to proactively prepare for the defense of family and nation, and 
were “encouraged to keep and monitor a well-stocked kitchen with supplies 
for possible use in a nuclear attack [and to] . . . co-ordinate familial civil 
defence exercises.”125 White women as goddesses of domesticity and na-
tional security were “both the causes and the potential redeemers of a dete-
riorating society.”126 But women were to be protectionist, not overprotec-
tive; in WWII America, Philip Wylie coined the term “momism” in 1942 
“to describe a cultural phenomenon of maternal over-protection apparently 
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responsible for an overly feminized American masculinity as well as a host 
of other social problems.”127  
In 1945, faced with the highest divorce rate in the world, government 
and social leaders ushered in a “cultural glorification of the family unit,”128 
promoting values such as “stable and traditional marriage.”129 In this era, the 
“state of the American family unit was consistently framed as a national 
issue of great moral significance.”130 In postwar films, Whiteness appeared 
“not through direct comparisons between [Whites] and ethnic or racial ‘oth-
ers’ but instead through the appropriation of universal qualities such as de-
votion to family, loyalty to friends, . . . sincerity, courage, and the capacity 
for romantic love.”131 This image of the ideal family provided a haven from 
a toxic social climate tense with anti-Communist suspicions, fears of nucle-
ar war, conformity, conservatism,132 and the demands of the “outside world” 
and industrial economy.133 
The embrace of suburbia also shaped the emotional structures of the 
White, middle-class families who took up residence in the suburban ranch 
houses. Increasingly, the family was seen as what Christopher Lasch 
termed, “a haven in a heartless world,”134 a source of companionship and 
emotional support, and comparatively isolated suburban dwellings were 
portrayed as havens of pleasant family togetherness.135 Families were not 
merely social units—clusters of relatives who lived with one another—but 
sociable units—individuals who enjoyed spending time with one another. 
Thus, family structures adapted to suburban ideals “about finding a homog-
enous community of like-minded people, about living in a home that pro-
vides comfort and diversion, and quite centrally, about finding an environ-
ment in which family ties can be strengthened.”136 The suburban lifestyle 
aided this evolution, isolating families from one another and removing 
ready access to the many opportunities and public spaces where family 
members socialized with others outside the family that had characterized 
city life.137 This isolation both matched and reinforced a well-grounded cul-
tural emphasis on individualism and family autonomy.138 
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The image of the White, middle-class suburban family was fueled not 
only by governmental and market incentives, but also by cultural mediums 
that rendered suburban models of family life desirable and attainable. In 
describing how these images continue to be reinforced through contempo-
rary cultural mediums, Pyke has noted that “[p]arents in . . . middle-class, 
mostly White, television families are emotionally nurturing and supportive, 
understanding, and forgiving . . . . [S]uch shows tend to focus on the suc-
cessful resolution of relatively minor family problems, which the characters 
accomplish through open communication and the expression of loving con-
cern.”139  
Although the white picket fences of Leave It to Beaver are now rough-
ly sixty years behind us, their influence is still evident in White middle-class 
values of today; mainstream culture still “glorifies and presents as norma-
tive that family headed by a breadwinning husband with a wife who, even if 
she works for pay, is devoted primarily to the care of the home and chil-
dren.”140 Today, the idealized American family remains one characterized 
by interpersonal and emotional relations prioritizing sensitivity, honesty, 
open communication, flexibility, forgiveness, democratic ideals, individual 
autonomy, and psychological well-being.141 Images of intimate family life 
continue to be marked by affection and sentimentality.142 Although many 
now mock the conformity of suburban denizens and environments,143 and 
can frankly acknowledge that the suburban vision of family intimacy is it-
self an idealization, this image continues to maintain a prominent cultural 
foothold.144 At front and center of today’s idealized White, middle-class 
family structure is a “valuation of private life, centered on the family, over 
all forms of public intercourse.”145 Even though one might not be able to 
fully attain them, society still appears to believe in and cultivate suburban 
ideals despite the harsh realities of domestic violence and child abuse and 
neglect: 
[T]here is still a strong sense that the sentiment behind it is a noble goal, and that 
suburbia offers the best chance to reclaim the spirit of togetherness. Suburban liv-
ing is thought to hold the possibility of shielding children from urban drugs and ur-
ban-inspired nihilism, and of reminding adults that domestic ‘values’ are the ones 
that really matter the most to them.146 
  
 139. Pyke, supra note 105, at 241 (citations omitted). 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Preston, supra note 111, at 471. 
 144. Miller, supra note 114, at 395. 
 145. Id. at 397. 
 146. Id. at 402. 
882 Michigan State Law Review  Vol. 2011:857 
 
Moreover, most readily accept that middle-class values promote per-
sonal and social well-being. As partners and parents, Americans attempt to 
distinguish themselves through adherence to these values, and may experi-
ence anxiety, guilt, or social censure if they or their children do not measure 
up.147 While these values are in fact emblematic of middle-class ideology, 
they are widely regarded as matters of “common sense,” as basic mores 
embraced by all “decent” Americans irrespective of class, ethnicity, gender, 
or race. They are so fundamental that most cannot imagine their own 
lives—or anyone else’s life—without them.148 And society continues to 
blame social problems on family structures that do not fit this mold, “sug-
gest[ing] policies that ignore or punish families that don’t fit the construct,” 
and implicitly condemning their members on the bases of race, ethnicity, 
and class.149 
B.  The Construction of the Dysfunctional, Lower-Class Black Family 
It is not surprising that Whiteness and the myth of the idealized White, 
middle-class suburban family have in turn generated myths about other fam-
ilies that do not fit this mold, including African-American families, poor 
White families, and immigrant families. Black families provide a case-in-
point.  
Although all families are judged by the standard of the intact nuclear 
family, society holds out very different expectations for members of White 
families than for members of Black families. Expectations for White fami-
lies are consistent with the idealized, White middle-class family structure; 
those for Black families are much lower.150 According to Stephanie Coontz, 
the stereotypical Black family is construed not as stable but as broken: “In 
almost every decade, for 200 years, someone has ‘discovered’ that the black 
family is falling apart.”151 Thus, across the tracks from White middle-class 
suburbia and its images of cozy family intimacy have sprung contrasting 
myths of Black families, including the clan “headed by a single mother with 
numerous children and living in a roach-infested tenement,”152 or the family 
that produces Black criminals that White society must capture and 
convict.153  
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One development in particular directed national attention to poor 
Black families, and “helped to establish the conventional wisdom that the 
black family system was and still is distinctively different from the rest of 
the population.”154 In 1965, a report by then-sociologist (and later U.S. 
Senator) Daniel Patrick Moynihan was released entitled, The Negro Family: 
The Case for National Action.155 Better known as the “Moynihan Report,” 
the report addressed the root causes of Black poverty; Moynihan concluded 
that the absence of fathers in Black families and female-headed households 
led to a variety of social ills, including illegitimate children, welfare 
dependence, and ultimately economic and political inequality.156 Apparently 
influenced by the idealized image of the White, middle-class nuclear family, 
Moynihan reported that Black families headed by Black females, fostered 
by social forces beginning with slavery, undermined the authority of Black 
boys and men:  
In essence, the Negro community has been forced into a matriarchal structure 
which, because it is too out of line with the rest of the American society, seriously 
retards the progress of the group as a whole, and imposes a crushing burden on the 
Negro male and, in consequence, on a great many Negro women as well.157 
Thus, the dysfunctional Black family, headed by the single Black 
mother, was irrevocably linked to the genesis of the Black male criminal.158  
The report was criticized almost immediately by leaders in the Black 
and civil rights communities for stereotyping the Black family and for locat-
ing the causes of poverty within the Black community instead of within 
larger social influences such as racism or discrimination.159 In 1971, Wil-
liam Ryan published Blaming the Victim, coining the famous phrase in the 
course of critiquing the Moynihan Report’s focus on Blacks’ behavior, cul-
ture, and lifestyle to the exclusion of broader social structures.160 Others 
observed that Moynihan failed to see that the changes taking place in poor 
Black families were also happening among other types of poor families.161 
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Moreover, this publication had a tremendous effect on sociological scholar-
ship. Prior to the Moynihan Report, Furstenberg reports, researchers such as 
W.E.B. Du Bois reported class differences in Black communities that mir-
rored stratifications in mostly White communities; although “at the lower 
end, the distribution of families across the social class spectrum varied 
enormously for whites and blacks[;] . . . descriptions of family life were cast 
in remarkably similar terms.”162 But following the Moynihan report, re-
searchers focused on issues such as the “culture of poverty” and changing 
poor families’ values, and so for a time, sociological scholarship lost its 
“comparative focus on intraethnic and intraracial class differences and 
interethnic and interracial class similarities.”163 
In the 1980s, similar alarmist discourses surfaced in debates about 
“poverty, race, and family,” embodied in fears of swelling populations of 
poor Blacks and images of the Black “welfare queen” popularized by con-
servatives.164 Again, these images of Black families were contrasted with the 
idealized White, middle-class family, creating “a vision of white society and 
white cultural values as under siege by the uncivilized blacks,” and giving 
rise to narratives of White victimization instead of social inequality.165 Ac-
cording to Lane, these narratives “not only resist the telling of race, gender, 
and class subordination, but also resist an understanding of black families 
outside the framework of pathology, irresponsibility, and danger.”166 Popu-
lar culture has also fallen into the trap of examining Black family life 
through the lens of Whiteness. It was not until the “The Cosby Show” that 
millions of White families invited a “nice, normal” Black television family 
into their living rooms; numerous scholars have criticized the upper-class 
Huxtables for tracking too closely White stereotypes and values.167 Ironical-
ly, however, some family scholars have faulted others for essentially the 
same mistake—unquestioningly placing White, middle-class models of 
family life on a pedestal as the standard to which all other family structures 
should be compared. As Pyke explains:  
Family scholars have rarely displayed analytic concern about the emphasis on 
emotional expressiveness and affective sentimentality that pervades much of the 
family ideology, probably because the majority—who as middle-class, well-
educated Whites live in the heartland of such values—do not regard them as prob-
lematic. As a result, this Western value orientation can seep imperceptibly into the 
interpretive framework of family research.168 
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These statistics and scholarship have produced and reinforced myths 
or stereotypes about Black families that are broady disseminated, widely 
accepted, and extremely harmful. Research studies indisputably affect 
individuals’ lives; as Allen notes:  
Social and behavioral research findings exert profound influence on public policy, 
which shapes the lives of an inordinate number of Black families and children. . . . 
It would be naïve to think that research findings have no consequences for how key 
decision makers operate. Research findings taught in the classroom, reported in 
popular scholarly journals, reported in the popular media, and discussed over cock-
tails, shape their ideas of both the appropriate and the possible.169 
Allen, for one, strongly criticizes existing scholarship on Black fami-
lies for its “theoretical and methodological shoddiness” and “ignorance con-
cerning the internal dynamics and motives of Black family life in this socie-
ty.”170 Existing research, he maintains, has become riddled with “crude cate-
gories, poorly defined concepts, and negative stereotypes,” including 
references to “‘family disorganization,’ the ‘underclass,’ ‘culture of 
poverty,’ and ‘the Black matriarchy.’”171 Empirical studies frequently en-
gage in apples-to-oranges comparisons between two-parent White families 
and single-parent Black families and then label the findings as racial differ-
ences.172 Researchers design studies focusing on married couples with chil-
dren who are mostly White and middle-class, along with families with 
“relatively minor difficulties.”173 Other types of families are seen as “excep-
tional” and are included under the “diversity” category, and families with 
more serious problems are studied as localized examples of a particular is-
sue—“poverty, illness, or disability”—and not in a manner that integrates 
the problem “as part of the fabric of family experience.”174 Finally, many 
scholars seeking explanations for Black family structures, whether they 
theorize that Black culture was “lost during slavery” or that a distinct Black 
culture exists, have urged Black families to attempt to mirror White families 
in order to make their families healthy and strong and to ensure success.175  
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Only relatively recently have scholars begun to note that the differ-
ences between Black families and mainstream White models are not signs 
of dysfunction. Rather, these different family structures have evolved in 
response to different social challenges; Black family structures exemplify 
“flexible, effective ways of pooling resources and building community,” 
and accord the same priority to extended family and civic networks as 
White family structures.176 According to historian Stephanie Coontz, the 
Black family structure itself is not a social challenge that Black communi-
ties have had to overcome.177  
Other scholars have urged family studies scholars to cease analyzing 
Black family structures and lives from the external and contrasting perspec-
tive of the White, middle-class family.178 Adopting a radically different and 
more neutral orientation, Allen contends, would produce more honest and 
accurate scholarship that accepts Black families on their own terms and that 
would illustrate how “the trends in African American family life [are] much 
more complex and elusive” than they are currently portrayed.179 In addition, 
patterns thought to be characteristic of “Black family life” are now charac-
teristic of other family structures as well; recent class-comparative sociolog-
ical studies conclude that “white patterns of sexual behavior, family for-
mation, and gender relations among lower-income families increasingly 
resemble the family patterns that troubled Moynihan,”180 including trends 
among low-income Whites towards nonmarital childbearing and a growing 
tendency to postpone marriage while pregnant.181  
Black families need not and must not be expected to fit into White 
molds or declared “broken” or “dysfunctional” when they do not. Different 
family structures evolve in response to different social forces, but these dis-
tinctions are not inherently negative—any such normative gloss is applied 
by other social and cultural forces. For instance, whereas White men’s wag-
es have historically been high enough for their wives to stay home, both 
Black parents have traditionally been wage earners because most Black men 
could not earn enough to keep their wives out of the labor force.182 Thus, 
Black women have enjoyed more economic independence than White wom-
en, fostering attitudes of freedom and equality.183 Black women have also 
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played key roles as “culture bearers” and have developed “female-centered 
networks” that extend notions of family in which living without a man is 
acceptable.184  
Other, more recent statistics reveal that, overall, Black families con-
tinue to differ from White families. Black marriage rates have declined 
more sharply than in other groups, perhaps because there are more Black 
women than men, producing a shortage of marriable mates.185 It is frequent-
ly reported that forty-three percent of Black families are headed by women 
as compared to thirteen percent of White families, that 22.5% of Black fam-
ilies live below the poverty line whereas just 8.4% of White families do, and 
that the median income for Black families is only two-thirds that of White 
families.186 Other, lesser-known statistics indicate that Black families attend 
church more frequently than White families, and their members enjoy great-
er contact with grown siblings and more visits from other family mem-
bers.187 And many studies conclude that Black families generally are more 
cohesive, better organized, more open to free expression of feelings, more 
emotionally supportive of their children, and experience less conflict than 
White families—even after adjustments for respondents’ socioeconomic 
status in childhood and adulthood.188  
C.  How Social Constructions and Stereotypes of Family and Family Life 
Affect Empathy and Capital Mitigation 
If negative constructs such as the dysfunctional Black family or poor 
White family affect our perceptions of and empathic identification with 
others in everyday interactions, it is highly improbable that they would not 
impact jurors in a capital sentencing phase.189 Disparate images of family 
structures remain a fertile source of cultural dissonance.190 The defendant’s 
family and family history, offered as a mitigating explanation for the de-
fendant’s bad acts or illness, may “unintentionally yet dangerously repro-
duce and thus legitimize racist tropes about black family life.”191 Yet, “very 
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little has been said about how stereotypes regarding black families might 
also shape and determine those sentencing decisions,” and mitigation trea-
tises and scholarship rarely address these stereotypes or their impact.192  
Moreover, the disparities between conflicting images of family life are 
bolstered by social science evidence on the effects of childhood poverty.193 
No matter his race, not every child who is abused grows up to be a killer.194 
Yet, there is a large body of social science research on how child abuse and 
neglect, poverty, and other factors have both immediate and long-lasting 
effects and produce problems later in children’s lives, including increasing 
the likelihood of criminal behavior.195 These conditions have cumulative 
effects; for example, poverty places increased strain on parents, increasing 
the likelihood that they will abuse and neglect their children, place too much 
responsibility upon their shoulders, or provide “psychologically unavailable 
caregiving” where adults devote their resources to managing their own 
problems and have nothing left for their children.196 
The goal of mitigation evidence is to humanize a convicted capital de-
fendant, to present him as a sympathetic figure, and to provide explanations 
for his violent conduct that illustrate a weakened capacity for self-control or 
judgment.197 Such evidence may consist of an absence of social supports, 
bonding, supervision, parental absence, deprivation, mental or physical dis-
abilities or unmet health needs, and immature moral development.198 
Evidence of a defendant’s family history is frequently introduced in 
capital sentencing proceedings;199 its importance was underscored in Wil-
liams v. Taylor,200 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a capital de-
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fense attorney provided ineffective representation for failing to introduce 
such evidence—the first time it made such a finding since Strickland v. 
Washington.201 The Supreme Court held that the defendant, Williams, had a 
constitutionally protected right to introduce mitigating evidence, and that 
his counsel had either failed to discover or failed to offer evidence of his 
“nightmarish childhood”—that Williams’s parents had been imprisoned for 
criminally neglecting their children, that he had been severely and repeated-
ly beaten by his father, that he had been in an abusive foster home while his 
parents were imprisoned, and that he had been returned to his parents after 
their release.202 Thus, the Court determined, Williams’s attorneys did not 
“conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.”203  
Mitigating evidence involving the defendant’s family begins to objec-
tify its members even before jurors learn of it. While both ABA Guidelines 
and Supreme Court jurisprudence emphasize the mitigating importance of 
family life and family history, they do not consider how “mitigation investi-
gation might impact the defendant’s family, whose deeply personal infor-
mation is often under intense scrutiny during the investigation” or how the 
investigation might affect other social groups.204 Emily Hughes has ob-
served that effective capital representation may entail a crisis of objectifica-
tion; capital defenders may portray “the defendant’s family and society at 
large as objects to be investigated rather than as subjects with independent 
needs,” yet feel that this is “necessary to protect a capital defendant’s right 
to effective assistance of counsel even if this objectification goes largely 
unexamined.”205 The participation of social workers and other mitigation 
specialists who are trained in “respecting family dynamics and individual 
dignity” may diminish the objectification experienced by individual family 
members,206 but will probably do little to prevent the defendant’s family as a 
whole from fitting into or triggering a negative dysfunctional family stereo-
type.  
Alycee Lane has written extensively on how the presentation of miti-
gation evidence involving the defendant’s family inevitably has conse-
quences for how the family and its members are portrayed by attorneys and 
perceived by jurors. She asserts that mitigation evidence literature implies 
that defense attorneys deploy the defendant’s family as a tool (in conjunc-
tion with expert witnesses) to explain not only the defendant’s current state, 
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but also his prior bad acts, forcing the family’s “sins” or “crimonogenic” 
influences into the spotlight.207 In mitigation narratives, then, the defend-
ant’s family is both revealed and concealed. The family inflicts abuse upon 
the defendant but is only explained in terms of abuse and neglect, and de-
tails of family life are limited to those that help to explain the defendant’s 
character and actions.208  
Yet, capital defense attorneys may be unwittingly ignorant of and may 
feel obliged to ignore the consequences of both family stereotypes and nar-
row portrayals of defendants’ families. According to Lane, mitigation narra-
tives and the defense attorneys who create them are likely “unselfcon-
scious” about the socially constructed nature of images of families in gen-
eral and the defendant’s family in particular.209 Mitigation discourse may be 
sensitive to racist stereotypes of Black defendants, but not of Black families. 
Capital defenders may not realize that “to tell the story of a defendant’s 
family life is to tell it against, or even in terms of, other narratives of “fami-
ly.”210 Moreover, Lane asserts, defense attorneys may also make other harm-
ful assumptions. They might believe that evidence of dysfunctional family 
life always aids a defendant’s case or humanizes him, regardless of the de-
fendant’s race, the specific facts of a defendant’s family history, and other 
variables.211 Conversely, they might presume that jurors’ preexisting con-
ceptions of what “normal” family life is like will not harm the defendant’s 
case, even though this conception will most often resemble the idealized 
White, middle-class family and not the defendant’s family.  
Jurors, too, may unknowingly assess mitigation evidence involving a 
defendant’s family or family history in a way that reinforces negative stere-
otypes, dehumanizes capital defendants and their relatives, and aggravates 
instead of mitigates. Lane contends that mitigating evidence concerning 
dysfunctional family history might persuade jurors that a particular defend-
ant is “anything but unique and individual,” merely the predictable bad out-
come of a predictably bad Black, poor, or otherwise problematic family.212 
Such evidence may also prompt jurors to perceive the defendant and his 
relatives as genetically “predatory and criminal in nature.”213 Or jurors may 
frame the capital trial itself, particularly the defense attorney’s mitigating 
arguments, as “a form of welfare by which they themselves are victimized” 
through wasted time and money.214 A vote for death might seem to be a vote 
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 209. Id. at 187. 
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for preserving the idealized White middle-class culture of “law-abiding, 
innocent, hardworking, family-oriented insiders.”215 Thus, mitigating evi-
dence that reinforces negative family stereotypes may inadvertently encour-
age jurors to judge both the defendant and his family harshly.216  
For these reasons, many scholars remain critical of contemporary mit-
igation narratives focusing on the defendant’s family. Lane asserts that such 
mitigation discourse “resists a deeper and fuller analysis of the family” and 
“contains the family within a limited, defendant-focused story that may ul-
timately drain the family of . . . dimensionality” so that it fits within the 
“preexisting stereotypes by which jurors define black family life.”217 The 
defendant’s humanity appears, if at all, as that of his family wanes, to the 
point that it becomes “a violent and uncontrollable collection of individu-
als.”218 Instead, Lane advocates, mitigation discourse needs to confront rac-
ist stereotypes of Black families so that mitigation narratives do not rein-
force these stereotypes, and attorneys should explore jurors’ conceptions of 
“normal” families through jury questionnaires and voir dire.219 
Although the previous discussion has focused on the impact of Black 
defendants’ families upon White jurors, our curiosity about and concern 
with the impact of stereotypes of family life upon jurors cannot be confined 
to race, but must extend to all differences. Thus, the issue with which Lane 
is most concerned—the impact upon jurors of mitigating evidence about a 
defendant’s dysfunctional Black family life—is only one part of the prob-
lem. One profound question involves mitigating evidence of functional fam-
ily life that approximates or attempts to approximate idealized visions of 
family life. Take, for instance, a capital defendant who grew up as the only 
child in a two-parent middle-class Black family, or a lower-income family 
headed by a single mother who, abandoned by her husband, worked several 
jobs to provide for the defendant and his many siblings. Such mitigating 
evidence tends to exonerate the defendant’s family, and not the defendant, 
and may not be highlighted as mitigating evidence at all. Or what about the 
White capital defendant who grows up in a dysfunctional White family—the 
idealized image of the White middle-class family is equally damning to 
White defendants whose families do not measure up. Another research 
question is whether (and why) if jurors do not expect certain defendants’ 
families to be dysfunctional, they still compare these families to approxi-
mate idealized constructions that come to seem “normal” or “healthy”; do 
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they assume that, like (most) other members of their race or class, such fam-
ily members will not “measure up”? Empirical data from interviews with 
capital jurors, in which jurors described their perceptions of defendant’s 
family members, help us begin to assess how jurors form perceptions and 
what types of perceptions jurors form about a variety of defendant’s family 
members on the basis of their past conduct and trial behavior.  
III. HOW JURORS REGARD DEFENDANTS’ FAMILIES: EVIDENCE FROM 
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH  
A. What We Know From Prior Social Science Research 
Social science research suggests that jurors can comprehend mitiga-
tion evidence of a defendant’s family in a variety of different ways, not all 
of which are beneficial to a defendant’s case. Mitigation evidence that re-
duces a capital defendant’s culpability for murder can be categorized as 
either “proximate” (which “speaks to the defendant’s lack of responsibility 
for what he has done”) or remote (which “speaks to his lack of responsibil-
ity for who he is”).220 Mitigation evidence of dysfunctional family life is 
classified as remote, since it focuses on the defendant’s character.221 Ac-
cording to Steven Garvey, jurors might not find such evidence very persua-
sive; Garvey’s analysis of data from the Capital Juror Project222 demonstrat-
ed that only one-third of capital jurors assigned mitigating weight to evi-
dence that a defendant was seriously abused as a child, and only fifteen per-
cent of jurors assigned mitigating weight to evidence that a defendant had a 
background of extreme poverty, while approximately fifty percent would 
assign mitigating weight to evidence that a “defendant had been in state 
institutions but had never received any ‘real help or treatment.’”223 Garvey 
concluded: 
[N]otions of collective or societal responsibility for shaping the defendant’s char-
acter played some role in jurors’ capital sentencing decisions, especially if it ap-
peared that the defendant tried to get help for his problems but society somehow 
failed him. Notions of individual responsibility, however, played a larger role. Ju-
  
 220. Stephen Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors 
Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1562 (1998) (citing Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, 
Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 
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rors were not completely unsympathetic to factors that reduced the defendant’s re-
sponsibility for who he was, but they were more persuaded by factors that reduced 
his responsibility for what he had done, at least if he had no control over those fac-
tors.224 
Research also suggests that race influences jurors’ comprehension of 
family mitigation evidence. In one study by Mona Lynch and Craig Haney, 
Black and White mock jurors viewed various types of mitigating evidence 
for two sets of cases featuring either a White defendant and Black victim or 
a Black defendant and White victim: a mother’s testimony about physical, 
psychological, and sexual abuse committed by his stepfather; a half-
brother’s testimony about the abuse and how the defendant cared for and 
mentored him as a child; and a wife’s testimony about the defendant’s psy-
chological troubles and the fact that she and their children needed him and 
loved him.225 Afterwards, participants were asked to decide how to sentence 
the defendant, both individually and in small groups.226 Lynch and Haney 
found that in individual determinations, death-voting participants empha-
sized the facts of the murder, while life-voters prioritized the defendant’s 
terrible childhood and psychological problems.227 But race also appeared to 
influence participants’ valuation of this mitigation evidence; sixty-eight 
percent of life-voters who named child abuse as the most important evi-
dence viewed the White defendant materials, while fifty-nine percent of 
death-voters who ranked the child abuse evidence least important viewed 
the Black defendant materials.228 Similarly, in group settings, ninety-four 
percent of life-voters named the abuse and psychological evidence as most 
important (sixty-four percent of which viewed White defendant materi-
als).229  
But Lynch and Haney’s study also demonstrated that jurors can view 
mitigating evidence of abuse as an aggravator.230 Some death-voters inap-
propriately ranked the child abuse evidence most important; fifty-eight per-
cent of these individuals viewed the Black defendant materials.231 One 
death-voting mock juror who viewed the Black defendant materials listed 
the child abuse evidence as both least and most important, wondering simul-
taneously why the defendant hadn’t attacked his stepfather if the beatings 
were the root cause and where the mother had been while her children were 
being attacked.232 Lynch concluded that, although few participants men-
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tioned race, there was evidence of subtle prejudice in their “withholding of 
empathy for the Black defendant, and indeed some resentment that such a 
sentiment was sought for him.”233 While this study did not directly assess 
the impact of negative stereotypes of Black families and idealized images of 
White middle-class families, its results suggest that these constructions have 
complex influences upon jurors. Indeed, Lynch observed that “racialized 
stereotypes about the propensity of violence among Blacks appeared to 
shape several of our mock jury participants’ assessments of the defendant’s 
life history.”234 
Other empirical research confirms that White jurors frequently employ 
various strategies to distance themselves from Black defendants, such as 
viewing the Black defendant not as a unique individual but as a faceless out-
group member. Fleury-Steiner has posited that White jurors perform racial 
hegemony by “emplotting stories of their own experiences into the broader 
narrative of evaluating the defendant’s responsibility for the crime.”235 To 
these ends, White jurors may evolve a variety of thematic narratives, such 
as accounts that focus on the “tragedy of the ‘black’ group”236 (i.e., “[i]t was 
a very sad situation all the way around, he was black, raised in the ghetto, 
and so on”).237 These narratives encourage White jurors to see a Black de-
fendant not as a unique individual with a distinctive and tragic life history, 
but as part of a “valueless, ‘black’ group” suffering from race-wide trage-
dies such as child neglect.238 Fleury-Steiner found evidence of these narra-
tives in jurors’ remarks such as, “I just saw him as a loser from day one, as 
soon as he was born into that environment, and into that set of people who 
basically were into drugs, alcohol, illegitimacy, AIDS, the whole nine 
yards,” and “there are 10,000 others like him out there, which is very trag-
ic.”239 Jurors’ comments also revealed that media coverage helps White ju-
rors to form stories of “what ‘these people are’”; when asked how well the 
phrase “severely abused as a child” fit the defendant, one juror replied, “I 
believe that was what he endured most as a child: severe neglect. They were 
from the lower socioeconomic Black group. From what we read about in the 
paper a lot, he was definitely from that group.”240  
Fleury-Steiner has also observed that Black jurors critique White sub-
urban stereotypes and express frustration with White jurors’ inability to see 
into Black experience. One working-class Black male juror lamented, “They 
  
 233. Id. at 200. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Benjamin Fleury-Steiner, Narratives of the Death Sentence: Toward a Theory of 
Legal Narrativity, 36 L. & SOC’Y REV. 549, 560 (2002). 
 236. Id. at 560 
 237. Id. at 562. 
 238. Id.  
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 562-63. 
 The Family Capital of Capital Families 895 
 
wanted to fry those black boys . . . . I felt that they didn’t give a shit one 
way or the other. They wanted to go home to their husbands or to the foot-
ball game instead of worrying about whether these people were going to die 
or not.”241 Here, home “to their husbands” and “‘football games’—as a trope 
of white indifference”—both express the juror’s disillusionment with “the 
lack of concern the white majority had toward [the defendant’s] life” and a 
negative evaluation of the “white suburban lifestyle.”242 Another college-
educated Black female juror expressed frustration with failed efforts to edu-
cate fellow White jurors about “poor blacks’ lifestyles”:  
There was testimony where they said that the defendant stayed out until eleven 
o’clock at night. But we are looking at a different kid here. This kid came out of a 
broken home where there was no structure, no authority figures. . . . And they were 
arguing, “Well, my kid comes in at such and such.” . . . And I was frustrated. . . . 
Because they were looking at this thing from a white middle-class perspective, and 
you have to put yourself in that black lifestyle this kid came out of. That particular 
lifestyle where there was not a good home, no supervision, there were no authority 
figures for this kid.243 
Here, jurors’ explicit comparisons between a Black defendant’s child-
hood and those of White jurors’ children do not merely indicate conflicting 
images of family life, but actually produce and reinforce cultural distance 
and social estrangement from Black life.244 Thus, Fleury-Steiner concludes:  
Media and jurors’ personal resources give meaning to an underlying clash of cul-
tures in jurors’ cultural distance stories. Both popular culture and personal experi-
ences help them confirm what they already know about “blacks” like the defend-
ant. Using such cultural and personal capital enables jurors to see the defendant as 
“other” and indeed worthy of the death sentence.245 
Finally, research involving quantitative CJP data has enabled us to 
learn much about whether and when jurors identify with defendants and 
their family members. According to Bowers, Steiner, and Sandys, fifty-one 
percent of participant jurors stated they imagined themselves in the situation 
of the defendant’s family.246 Juror identification with the defendant and the 
defendant’s family was most common among Black jurors in Black defend-
ant/White victim capital cases, and less common among White jurors, par-
ticularly White males.247 Fleury-Steiner has noted, however, that “more-
educated white jurors were more likely to express an understanding and 
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sympathy toward a Black defendant’s upbringing and disadvantaged sur-
roundings.”248 Black male jurors in particular were significantly more likely 
to say that the defendant was someone who loved his own family and to 
deny that the defendant’s family seemed very different from his own.249 
Thus, Bowers and his coauthors concluded, “The identification black male 
jurors make with the defendant and his family must make them especially 
sensitive to the human dimensions of the capital sentencing decision, and it 
must surely enhance their receptivity to mitigation.”250 Though these obser-
vations are no doubt helpful, more analysis is needed as to why White jurors 
seem reluctant to identify with the defendant’s family, and about jurors’ 
“investment . . . in white families as paradigms of normality and functionali-
ty.”251  
B. A Closer Look at Quantitative and Qualitative Capital Juror Project Data 
We will now turn to what jurors interviewed in CJP data found memo-
rable about defendants’ family members; this research illustrates on what 
bases jurors form perceptions of and react to defendants’ family members, 
and what aspects of trial narratives, testimony, and individual behavior can 
activate particular constructs of family life. This CJP study involved 1,198 
capital jurors who were involved in the trials of 466 Black defendants and 
626 White defendants.252 As part of the interview, former capital jurors were 
asked the following question: “Whether or not they came to the trial, did 
you have any of the following thoughts or feelings about (DEF) ______’s 
family?” They then were asked to answer “yes,” “no,” or “not sure” to a 
number of options: whether they imagined themselves in the defendant’s 
family’s situation; felt anger or rage toward the defendant’s family; felt con-
tempt or hatred for the defendant’s family; felt sympathy or pity for the de-
fendant’s family; thought that the defendant’s family seemed very different 
from their own families; wished they knew the defendant’s family personal-
ly; imagined themselves as members of the defendant’s family; and had 
other reactions. When asked if they had “other reactions” to the defendant’s 
family, 321 jurors chose to give qualitative responses. Only twenty-one of 
these participants were Black, the remainder were White. 
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1. General Quantitative Trends and Patterns in Jurors’ Perceptions 
of Defendants’ Family Members  
In general, jurors affirmed that they were willing to or had empathical-
ly engaged with the defendant’s family members. 47.5% of jurors had imag-
ined themselves in the defendant’s family’s situation, and 14.5% stated that 
they had actually imagined themselves as a member of the defendant’s 
family. Few jurors (only 11%) felt anger or rage for the defendant’s family; 
even fewer felt contempt or hatred (5.7%). By contrast, 81% felt sympathy 
or pity for the defendant’s family. A majority of jurors (63.1%) did seem to 
feel that the defendant’s family was very different than their own, and very 
few (6.3%) wished that they knew the defendant’s family personally.  
It is striking that responses were largely consistent between jurors in 
cases involving Black defendants and those in cases involving White de-
fendants, as seen below in Tables 1 through 4. Slight differences became 
evident when juror race was factored in; for example, Black jurors were 
slightly more likely (by 6-9%) to imagine themselves in the defendant’s 
family’s situation than White jurors, and much more likely (by 10-18%) to 
imagine themselves as members of the defendant’s family. This may sug-
gest that, as Bowers and his colleagues have reported, Black jurors tend to 
be more empathic than White jurors. 
 
 
 
Imagined Self in Def’s 
Family’s Situation 
Imagined Self as Member 
of Def’s Family 
 YES NO YES NO 
Black Def 47.8% (217) 52.2% (237) 14.8% 85.2% 
White Def 47.9% (293) 52.1% (319) 14.3% 85.7% 
Table 1: Whether Jurors Imagined Themselves in the Defendant’s 
Family’s Situation or as Part of the Family (broken down by defendant 
race) 
 
 Felt Anger/Rage Towards 
Def’s Family 
Felt Contempt/Hatred 
Towards Def’s Family 
 YES NO YES NO 
Black Def 10% (46) 90% (414) 6.1% (28) 93.9% (432) 
White Def 12.4% (77) 87.6% (546) 5.8% (36) 94.2% (582) 
Table 2: Whether Jurors Felt Negative Emotions Towards the Defend-
ant’s Family (broken down by defendant race) 
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 Felt Sympathy or Pity For 
Def’s Family 
Defendant’s Family 
Seemed Very Different  
 YES NO YES NO 
Black Def 81.2% (372) 18.8% (86) 66% (280) 34% (144) 
White Def 81.9% (503) 18.1% (111) 60.6% (349) 39.4% (227) 
Table 3: Whether Jurors Felt Sympathy or Pity Towards the Defend-
ants’ Family or Thought They Seemed Very Different (broken down by 
defendant race) 
 
 Wished Knew Def’s Family Personally 
 YES NO 
Black Def 6.6% (67) 93.4% (387) 
White Def 6.1% (88) 93.9% (566) 
Table 4: Whether Jurors Wished They Knew the Defendant’s Family 
Personally (broken down by defendant race) 
 
Table 5: Whether Jurors Imagined Themselves in the Defendant’s 
Family’s Situation or as Part of the Defendant’s Family (broken down 
by defendant race and juror race) 
 
The data also reveal several other interesting trends and patterns, some 
of which may be specious due to small numbers of Black jurors (particular-
ly in cases involving Black defendants). Of course, all should be reassessed 
in future research. As seen in Table 6, Black jurors appeared to be twice as 
likely to feel anger or rage towards a Black defendant’s family than a White 
defendant’s family (8.3% versus 4.4%, respectively), and White jurors were 
roughly 33% more likely to feel anger or rage towards a White defendant’s 
  Imagined Self in Def’s 
Family’s Situation 
Imagined Self as Member 
of Def’s Family 
  YES NO YES NO 
Black 
Jurors 
Black 
Def  
54.2% (32) 45.8% 
(27) 
23.7% 
(14) 
76.3% (45) 
 White 
Def 
53.3% (24) 46.7% 
(21) 
30.2% 
(13) 
69.8% (30) 
White 
Jurors 
Black 
Def 
45.7% 
(172) 
54.1% 
(203) 
13.3% 
(50) 
86.7% (325) 
 White 
Def 
47.7% 
(264)  
52.3% 
(289) 
12.8% 
(71)  
87.2% (485) 
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family than a Black defendant’s family (13.1% versus 9.7 %, respectively). 
Black jurors also appeared marginally more likely to feel contempt or rage 
for Black defendants’ families than White defendants’ families, while White 
jurors’ responses were almost identical for both racial categories.  
 
Table 6: Whether Jurors Felt Negative Emotions Towards the Defend-
ant’s Family (broken down by defendant race and juror race) 
 
Moreover, as Table 7 illustrates, Black jurors were roughly 12% more 
likely to feel sympathy or pity for White defendants’ family members than 
for relatives of Black defendants; again, White jurors’ responses were con-
sistent across both racial categories. White jurors were marginally more 
likely to state that Black defendants’ families seemed very different from 
their own families than White defendants’ families. Finally, as shown in 
Table 8, Black jurors indicated they wished to know White defendants’ 
family members three times as often as they indicated they wished to know 
Black defendants’ family members (16.3% versus 5.1%, respectively), 
whereas White jurors’ responses were consistent across racial categories.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Felt Anger/Rage To-
wards Def’s Family 
Felt Contempt/Hatred 
Towards Def’s Family 
  YES NO YES NO 
Black 
Jurors 
Black 
Def  
8.3% (5) 91.7% 
(55) 
3.3% (2) 96.7% 
(58) 
 White 
Def 
4.4% (7) 95.6% 
(98) 
0% (0) 100% 
(45) 
White 
Jurors 
Black 
Def 
9.7% (37) 90.3% 
(343) 
6.6% (25) 93.4% 
(355) 
 White 
Def 
13.1% (74)  86.9% 
(489) 
6.4% (36) 93.6% 
(523) 
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Table 7: Whether Jurors Felt Sympathy or Pity Towards the Defend-
ants’ Family or Thought They Seemed Very Different (broken down by 
defendant race and juror race) 
 
Table 8: Whether Jurors Wished They Knew the Defendant’s Family 
Personally (broken down by defendant race and juror race) 
 
My purpose in summarizing this data is not to assert that these trends 
and patterns definitively exist, but merely to illustrate what types of infor-
mation have been collected, to display the potential of this type of empirical 
research, and to argue that further investigation is urgently needed. As it 
stands, it appears as if both Black jurors and White jurors may be harsher on 
the defendants’ family members of their own race. If this is in fact accurate, 
then perhaps jurors are forming negative perceptions of those families that 
either go against idealized constructs of middle-class family life (in the case 
of White jurors and White defendants’ family members) or confirm nega-
tive stereotypes of dysfunctional families (in the case of Black jurors and 
Black defendants’ families). Also, to the extent that Black jurors actually 
feel sympathy or pity for White defendants’ families or wish they knew 
them personally, it might be that racial differences between jurors and de-
fendants either prompts jurors to be more cautious when answering re-
searchers’ questions or encourages them to more carefully consider their 
  Felt Sympathy or 
Pity For Def’s Family 
Def’s Family Seemed 
Very Different  
  YES NO YES NO 
Black 
Jurors 
Black 
Def  
76.7% 
(46) 
23.3% 
(14) 
50.9% 
(28) 
49.1% 
(27) 
 White 
Def 
88.4% 
(38) 
11.6%  
(5) 
47.7% 
(21) 
52.3% 
(23) 
White 
Jurors 
Black 
Def 
81.7% 
(309) 
18.3% 
(69) 
68.9% 
(242) 
31.1% 
(109) 
 White 
Def 
81.5% 
(453) 
18.5% 
(103) 
61.9% 
(320) 
38.1% 
(197) 
  Wished Knew Def’s Family Per-
sonally 
  YES NO 
Black Jurors Black Def  5.1% (3)  94.9% (56) 
 White Def 16.3% (7) 83.7% (36) 
White Jurors Black Def 6.9% (26) 93.1% (349) 
 White Def 5.3% (29) 94.7% (516) 
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perceptions of defendants’ family members at trial. More research is needed 
with increased numbers of cases (such as those involving Black ju-
rors/Black defendants) to determine if these relationships are significant.  
2. Assessing Jurors’ Qualitative Remarks About Defendants’ Family 
Members 
Jurors’ qualitative remarks concerning their assessments of defend-
ants’ family members provide additional insight into their thoughts about 
and reactions to these individuals, providing a much deeper perspective on 
why jurors may have felt anger, contempt, or sympathy for certain families 
and not for others.253 I propose that jurors’ empathic connections with de-
fendants’ families are based in large measure on their normative assess-
ments of the quality and extent of emotional connections within these fami-
lies—whether the emotional connections within capital defendants’ families 
are characterized as “normal” or “dysfunctional.” The question, of course, is 
what is considered “normal”?  
There are several dimensions of emotional connectedness. Jurors at-
tributed positive (and therefore normative) valence to several factors as 
signs of a “normal” or “functional” family, including perceptions of “love” 
or “caring” behaviors,254 an intact family, whether parents “tried their best” 
to raise their children right, whether parents had good jobs or nice homes or 
adequate money, whether families offered their support to the defendant 
(including attending his trial), and whether relatives reacted with appropri-
ate emotions to trial developments. Conversely, jurors evaluated many other 
factors negatively as symptomatic of a troubled or dysfunctional family: 
family separation (a family that was “not intact”), abuse between members, 
parents who were “failures” in some material or emotional respect, poor 
social and economic environments, lack of support for the defendant (in-
cluding failing to attend the trial), inappropriate emotional behavior at trial 
(e.g., relatives were emotionally distant), and family members who seemed 
to be either threatening or complicit in committing or covering up the de-
fendant’s crime. To preserve their anonymity, jurors will be referred to by 
number, and all will be referred to as members of the male gender. 
I have divided participants’ qualitative remarks into nine categories or 
themes. Four of these categories (Doing One’s Best, Importance of Love, 
Ingredients for Love, Appropriate Loving Attitudes) are positive; four oth-
  
 253. The quotations are not attributed to specific jurors by name because Capital Jury 
Project Interviews were anonymous in order to protect participants’ identities. Instead, par-
ticipating jurors were assigned numbers at the time of their interview. These numbers are, in 
turn, used to cite jurors’ remarks that appear in this Article.  
 254. Interestingly, all twenty-two jurors who used the terms “love” or “care” in their 
responses were white, and most of them were female (fifteen female, seven male). 
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ers (Bad Lifestyle, Toxic Family Relationships, Inappropriate Loving Atti-
tudes, Impact of the Lack of Love) are negative; one (Expressions of Empa-
thy) is neither positive or negative because it consists of jurors’ remarks 
about how they envisioned their empathic role at trial. 
a. The “Normal” Family 
Jurors perceived normal families to be affective families; one juror (5) 
empathically recalled “thinking at the time how lucky [I was] to be raised in 
a ‘normal’ family . . . ! How important the family is, a warm, nurturing, 
caring family with normal values and values [systems] is.” While such re-
flections show that emotional connections are important in distinguishing 
functional from dysfunctional family units, they did not reflect positively on 
defendants’ families that they perceived as emotionally dysfunctional (other 
jurors were “thankful” for their “good” families (7)). Still others commented 
on how the defendants’ relatives loved them: “[T]he Aunt that took him in 
spoke highly of [defendant] as a child . . . . [a]nd she really did dearly love 
him. He just somehow got off.” (26). 
Jurors looked for evidence that the defendants’ relatives loved them. 
Family members’ love for the defendant was often described as uncondi-
tional; one juror remarked that a defendant’s mother “loved him even if he 
wasn’t the right kind of boy,” (1587), and another was “sure they loved 
him” even though “[t]hey probably knew he was a bad boy” because that 
type of knowledge “[d]oesn’t stop you from loving and caring about him, 
just because you love somebody doesn’t mean you approve of what they 
do” (1619). Jurors could empathically relate to unconditional love: “They 
had[,] just like all of us that have had teenagers, you know they’ve had their 
problems with him . . . as a parent, I’ve gone through that.” (319). A juror 
even gave one defendant’s relative the benefit of the doubt when he en-
gaged in questionable behaviors out of love for the defendant: “Don’t know 
if his dad was just taken in by his son or just cared because he was his son. 
He gave/loaned defendant money during trial[,] and it turns out it was to 
hire someone to kill a witness.” (14).  
Some jurors’ remarks intimated that familial love occurred in certain 
family environments, predominantly “nice” homes where educated parents 
had secure, well-paying jobs. The very fact that a family’s child was a capi-
tal defendant probably led jurors to expect that the defendant’s family 
would not possess these qualities; one juror confessed to being “surprised 
that his parents were well educated and had good jobs” (141). But if these 
factors were present, jurors believed success should surely follow: 
I just didn’t understand how they could get themselves into such a mess as they did 
raising these kids. I mean, the father had a good job and they had money and land 
and a nice house for the area and I just couldn’t understand how things got out of 
hand (130).  
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Another juror (192) who remarked that the defendant came from a 
“normal, average family” admitted that he “couldn’t understand someone 
coming from that type of family and doing what he had done.” In these situ-
ations, one juror speculated that the defendant’s family might actually expe-
rience more emotional pain as a result of his actions: “It was obvious they 
were very well-to-do and prominent—they carried themselves well. The 
fact that the crime was committed by the son of a prominent family must 
have hurt even more.” (160). 
Normal families were also ones in which, although the family might 
not have been intact or experienced hard times, parents worked and sacri-
ficed for the betterment of their children; as one juror (19) said, “It appeared 
that his mother tried the best she could. She was the only one working, try-
ing to raise three kids with a husband she couldn’t count on.” 
Finally, in normal families, affective habits matched up with main-
stream White, middle-class values of emotional expression. They were 
“close” families whose members were “shocked by what he did” (91). 
Normal families attended the defendant’s trial to exhibit “solidarity” and 
“support” (99, 215). Jurors noted when the defendant had strong bonds with 
family members; one remarked that the defendant’s relationship with his 
mother was a “real healthy bond” (99). It was also appropriate for defend-
ant’s relatives to express emotion while testifying or while in the courtroom; 
one juror “felt sorry for the father. He cried a lot during testimony,” and 
others remarked that they heard defendants’ grieving relatives’ courtroom 
reactions to death sentences. A supportive family was a “very protective” 
family that “did not seem much different” from jurors’ own (1075). Some-
times, however, jurors could view an “ultra-supportive” family as potential-
ly blameworthy: “I also felt that the family was helping him cover up the 
crime.” (244). 
b. The “Dysfunctional” Family 
In contrast to normal families whose members enjoyed more educa-
tion, secure jobs with good wages, and comfortable houses, dysfunctional 
families were products of impoverished emotional, social, and material en-
vironments; “bad” lifestyles; and toxic family relationships. One juror re-
marked that the defendant’s family was a “[p]oor white beer drinking fami-
ly” (1830), and another established cultural distance between himself and a 
defendant’s family by noting that the family exemplified others found in 
that area: “They’re what they are. It’s the area that they live in; there’s a lot 
of that down there.” (18). 
These types of families suffered from relational, emotional, and eco-
nomic poverty. Toxic family relationships and terrible childhoods led to 
families that produced criminals and that jurors described as “the furthest 
thing from a family” (64). These types of parents were “losers” (10) who 
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“dropped the ball on raising [the defendant]” (15). Prominent examples in-
cluded abusive parents or parents who abandoned their children; one de-
fendant’s father “basically hauled up with his stakes and kinda took along a 
combination of some of the family and just left the area and left [defendant 
behind” (27). A family with an “absent father,” and a mother who didn’t 
even “know how old [the] defendant was” did not care about their children, 
could not provide a “good home life” and was “not a very close family” 
(1081). Jurors frequently talked about such parents in terms of disgust: “His 
mother never came to the trial at all and his father is every kind of pervert 
you can think of. His stepfather was a wifebeater and a child abuser. His 
father was a homosexual, wifebeater. His parents should have been on trial 
with him.” (1651). One juror noted that “[t]he entire family had a history of 
sodomy and incest” (8); another remarked that “they [family members] 
should have been there [on trial] because of his family history, he was trou-
bled; because of his broken home he became an outlaw” (9). 
Jurors emphasized that a lack of familial love as well as “family to-
getherness, unity” (1224) had terrible consequences for defendants. Jurors 
readily accepted the connection between being unloved as a child and turn-
ing to criminal behaviors as an adult. One juror emphasized that “they 
raised him like an animal. He had no love, [and was a] product of his envi-
ronment.” (382). Another noted that the defendant’s “[f]amily was some-
what brutal and incredibly distant. No love. So you could see the connection 
not that everyone who has no love goes out and kills everybody[,] but I bet 
a lot of people who do like this guy probably didn’t have warm loving [fam-
ilies].” (78). Such evidence did have a mitigating effect of sorts; it ex-
plained, but did not excuse, the defendant’s actions: “[T]here’s a little [] 
sense of, to me that didn’t justify why he became a murderer, but at least 
you could kinda piece together . . . how this could all take place . . . . so that 
was kind of an important feature.” (27). 
Not surprisingly, dysfunctional defendants’ families exhibited inap-
propriate loving attitudes towards the defendant at trial, which jurors found 
“hard to understand” (132) and “interesting” (1956). Jurors characterized 
these relationships as “disconnected” (89), “cold” (132), and ones in which 
relatives “didn’t seem like they cared that much” (1956). A few jurors re-
marked that any semblance of emotional closeness seemed like a perfor-
mance for the jury’s benefit, either “like a forced closeness to protect sonny 
all of a sudden” (217) or an attempt to “put on a good show for him when it 
comes time to see if he got the death penalty” (369). One juror who believed 
that the defendant’s family members only “pretended to care at trial” was in 
the restroom and “heard [the] mother say [she] hated [defendant], but [the] 
sister said [she] had to act like she loved him—very strange” (723). Jurors 
frequently speculated on whether the family’s affection was real or was all 
an act: “I guess I wondered if they had put on a show in raising this [man]. . 
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. . Had they really . . . taught him values. You know was it all just a big 
show, for our sakes, so had they really loved and cared for him?” (1264). 
But sometimes the defendant’s family members did not bother to sup-
port the defendant at trial at all or to the extent that jurors believed they 
should. One juror remarked, “I questioned his . . . closeness with them be-
cause of the fact that they were not there.” (167). Jurors frequently found it 
noteworthy when defendant’s family members were altogether absent: 
“[T]here was nobody there to support him. He had no support. The dead 
man’s family was there through the whole case, but the man who was alive 
had no support.” (656).  
Jurors were especially bothered by mothers or wives who did not pay 
attention or testify at trial, who attended infrequently, or did not attend at 
all. Undutiful wives attracted the most ire. It was easy for jurors to dispar-
age wives who were, to say the least, “colorful”:  
Kind of unusual that his wife never testified . . . . She was never there. They did 
show in the evidence a picture of his wife, 8 x 12 glossy, pregnant, in front of a 
store. Smoking a cigarette, very pregnant, shorts to mid-knee. Tattoos of snakes on 
her legs. Common-law wife. She looked like something from the circus (266). 
But jurors could also find fault with less colorful wives; one juror re-
marked of a defendant’s wife who was also a doctor, “[S]he was there may-
be every other day although she was a practicing physician[,] which may 
have made a difference. I felt that it was strange she wasn’t more involved 
in the case.” (229). Such disengagement irked jurors: “[The w]ife really 
bothered [me]⎯she slept or did crossword puzzles during trial. ‘She 
couldn’t care less about what was going on.’” (1083). There was a sense 
that a wife wasn’t really a “wife” if she exhibited such disinterest: “[S]he 
couldn’t testify against her husband, and I think that’s why they got mar-
ried—because they didn’t seem like a loving couple.” (39).  
Finally, jurors were taken aback when mothers did not testify on the 
defendant’s behalf. One was “really amazed” that a mother did not testify 
until “forced” (1697), and another was altogether unable to relate to or con-
done such behavior: “If this were my son. I was wondering how a mother 
would not be there for the child . . . . I just cannot comprehend . . . just no[t] 
to be at the trial.” (350).  
c. Jurors’ Remarks on Empathic Engagement with Defendants’ 
Family Members 
Jurors’ comments illustrated that many consciously attempted to em-
pathically engage with defendant’s family members, even if they did not 
actually term these connections “empathic.” Jurors compared defendants’ 
families to their own, remarking that they were thankful to have been raised 
in a “normal” or “good” family (presumably unlike the defendant). Jurors 
also noted that they had put themselves in family members’ shoes: “Just 
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thinking in terms of if I was a member of his family, how would I feel about 
this situation, how would I handle such a thing as this.” (212). Some re-
marked that the defendant’s family was “very different” from their own 
family, illustrating that they made comparisons between the defendant’s 
childhood experiences and relatives and their own. Another juror described 
this type of connection as a way of penetrating another’s being: 
I think as the trial went on, you felt like you knew this person because obviously 
all of this is coming out and your sympathy is going to the person even though you 
would have never met them in your life and never know them afterwards but you 
kinda . . . you’re down into their being if that makes any sense (980). 
Sometimes, empathic connections were facilitated by mutual experi-
ence of familial roles: “I felt pity for his mother because I’m a mother.” 
(86). Another juror felt very strongly for the defendant’s mother, and em-
phasized that some of her own mothering choices had been imperfect:  
The way the defense tried to paint it [as the father’s and mother’s fault] . . . . I real-
ly felt for that lady . . . . I think the lady did the best she could under the circum-
stances. . . . She could have done a million things wrong, but she also had to have 
done some things right. . . .  
 . . . I feel myself there’s a lot of things I could have done differently with  
mine . . . . You show me a perfect parent (1962). 
Other jurors saw empathic engagement as inherent in their decision-
making roles. One juror noted at length that:  
The only reason [I indicated “yes” to questions such as “whether juror identified 
with defendant’s family”] is to try to see things from their perspective in coming to 
our decisions, is there something they could do to help her? Or you know, the kind 
of effects it would have on them, either guilty or not guilty . . . so I just tried to put 
myself in their shoes, so to speak (59). 
More research is needed to determine how jurors see themselves as empa-
thizers as well as the types, strengths, directions, and impacts of empathic 
efforts and connections. 
IV. STRATEGIES FOR RECOGNIZING AND MANAGING JURORS’ RELIANCE ON 
CONSTRUCTIONS OF FAMILY LIFE 
Presented with evidence that stereotypes of family life do in fact im-
pact jurors’ capital judgments, the question we must resolve is not whether 
stereotypes of idealized White middle-class and disparate stereotypes of 
Black family life influence capital jurors, but how they do so, and how their 
positive influences can be amplified and their potentially fatal impact abat-
ed.  
Presumably, capital defense attorneys are as likely to be as ignorant or 
dismissive of cultural family stereotypes’ unconscious or subconscious in-
fluence as the rest of us and therefore need to be educated on these process-
es of influence and trained on how best to thwart them. Sunwolf, for one, 
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has urged that capital defenders “need coaching on how to become aware of 
the typical distortions they have developed about their clients and the facts 
of the case . . . [for example] a client’s childhood being perceived as excel-
lent ‘factual’ mitigation evidence rather than as ‘painful’ re-lived abuse.”255 
Scholars describe these training opportunities as limited, but capital defense 
training experts and non-profit organizations assert that they exist but are 
not readily forthcoming on particulars, on the grounds that such information 
must be closely held so to keep it from falling into prosecutorial hands. 
Other generally-applicable trial attorney training materials on jury dynam-
ics, however, provide an excellent picture of the types of capital defender 
education and training that would be useful.  
First, capital defense attorneys should learn that mitigating evidence 
involving the defendant’s family life and family members may be among 
the most frustrating types of evidence from which they will have to create 
their mitigation narratives. Defendants with abusive histories may be chal-
lenging clients who find it difficult to successfully collaborate with their 
attorneys. A capital defender working with a difficult client may not push to 
work with her client as deeply as she should, or may distance herself from 
her client out of her own anger, frustration, or sadness instead of focusing 
more on her client’s emotions, thoughts, and fears.256 If they are made ex-
plicitly aware of these tendencies through techniques that explicitly encour-
age attorneys to take their clients’ perspective, capital defenders may realize 
why clients are defensive and develop new strategies for working with 
them. For instance, attorneys may cease using “data-driven questioning” 
that triggers client resistance once they realize why such questioning 
prompts certain “adaptive functions,” encouraging defendants to become 
defensive when they feel threatened or self-protective when they feel vul-
nerable.257   
Second, capital defense attorneys should be trained to employ methods 
using empathy and imagination—the very same processes jurors rely upon 
to form perceptions of defendants’ family members—to encourage jurors to 
reconsider problematic opinions and evolve more conscientious and indi-
vidualized perceptions of defendant’s families. This is accomplished pri-
marily through talking with jurors, beginning in voir dire. Capital defenders 
should first assess what perceptions jurors have formed or could form about 
individuals like the defendant and his family members. For instance, an 
attorney could assess a potential juror’s value systems by asking what types 
  
 255. Sunwolf, Empathic Attunement Facilitation: Stimulating Immediate Task En-
gagement in Zero-History Training Groups of Helping Professionals, in 1 FACILITATING 
GROUP COMMUNICATION IN CONTEXT: INNOVATIONS AND APPLICATIONS WITH NATURAL 
GROUPS 74-75 (Lawrence Frey ed., 2006). 
 256. Id. at 69, 89.  
 257. Id. at 75. 
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of life goals or character attributes that potential juror prioritizes or dispar-
ages.258 It might be particularly useful to invoke a schema without reference 
to how it is relevant in the case at hand; an attorney who wants to assess 
jurors’ perceptions on how parental discipline affects a child’s character 
need not pose to jurors a hypothetical based on the defendant’s situation but 
instead could ask jurors if they can recall a time from their childhood when 
they were afraid of parental discipline, and ask them to describe that situa-
tion, immediately drawing jurors into their own experience.259  
Along these lines, Sunwolf advises attorneys to explicitly discuss a 
negative schema with jurors in voir dire to uncover which jurors may at-
tempt to put that schema aside and which will not.260 For example, an attor-
ney could follow a script: ask potential jurors about a particular schema 
(“Don’t we all think . . .”), opt into the negative schema herself (“Me too”), 
elaborate on the negative stereotype (“We also believe . . .”), introduce a 
weakened form of an alternative positive schema, ask jurors if this alternate 
schema might ever be true for one person or one situation, discuss these 
issues one-on-one with jurors, and follow with potential challenges for 
cause.261 This strategy both normalizes the human tendency to develop and 
use negative schemas and helps jurors to confront specific schemas that may 
prove to be especially problematic.  
Once capital defense attorneys are familiar with their jurors’ percep-
tions and values, they can prompt jurors to confront negative schemas and 
use empathic and imaginative techniques to encourage jurors to change 
them. A capital defender can comment directly upon a juror’s belief in a 
problematic negative schema. For instance, an attorney faced with a juror 
who remarks, “I wouldn’t be sympathetic to any defendant just because he 
had a bad childhood,” may respond through “collaborative conversation” 
(“Most folks might agree with you. Would you share your thinking on 
that?”), or may actively intervene to “normalize contrary positions.”262 Ei-
ther strategy ensures that the attorney is engaged in helping jurors to think 
  
 258. Sunwolf describes various types of value systems, including the pioneer (prizes 
work and thrift and hates dereliction and waste); enlightenment (prizes science and rationali-
ty and hates ignorance and irrationality); progressive (prizes practicality and progress and 
hates the old-fashioned and close-minded); transcendental (prizes emotion and humanitarian 
ideals like respect and love and hates science, reason, and coldness); personal success (prizes 
goals involving career, family, economic security and hates dullness, poverty, and laziness); 
and collective success (prizes cooperation and equality and hates selfishness and inequality). 
Sunwolf, supra note 255, at 147. 
 259. Id. at 132. 
 260. Id.   
 261. Id. at 128. 
 262. Id. at 299. 
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through and perhaps reject negative schemas instead of ignoring them or 
arguing with them.263  
Like others, jurors judge by comparison, and so capital defenders must 
actively intervene in juror impression formation by carefully constructing 
choice options.264 It is essential that capital defenders confront possible neg-
ative perceptions about key trial elements (i.e., the behavior of the defend-
ant’s mother towards the defendant when he was a child) as early as possi-
ble in order to prime jurors’ mental schemas that involve mothers and 
mothering behaviors.265 Attorneys can exploit jurors’ schemas by invoking a 
problematic schema just to draw specific contrasts between that image and 
the uniquely bad or good qualities of a particular individual. For instance, a 
capital defender can invoke jurors’ common knowledge about what it means 
to be a “good mother” and “use thematic adjectives to alter th[at image] . . . 
beginning in voir dire and continuing through opening statements,” such as 
by emphasizing: “[S]he wasn’t the sort of mother you had or your friends 
had. She was the sort of person who never should have been a mother to 
anyone.”266  
Other techniques of confrontation and reform may also prove useful. 
Since jurors are likely to compare the defendant’s family to an idealized 
image of a White middle-class family, attorneys may provide them with 
more diverse images of family life; “[t]he attorney who offers an anchor for 
comparison participates in the juror’s comparing processes, while the one 
who does not leaves it up to the juror.”267 A capital defender could also de-
scribe the power and dangers inherent in mental categories and simplified 
judgments before moving on to a discussion of a specific negative schema 
relevant to the case, wherein she asks jurors how long they have believed in 
that schema or whether they have defended it to others who felt different-
ly.268 If we tend to attribute our own mistakes to temporary circumstances 
and those of others to personality flaws, then an effective defense attorney 
could help jurors realize that many different variables affect their own be-
haviors and mistakes before asking them to apply this new principle of self-
awareness to others.269 Alternatively, she could ask jurors to evaluate their 
own behaviors as if they were outside observers, or to view another’s be-
haviors as if they were in that person’s shoes.270 Both strategies increase the 
likelihood that jurors will be more empathic and apply situational reason-
  
 263. Id. at 301. 
 264. Id. at 40. 
 265. Id. at 130. 
 266. Id. at 126. 
 267. Id. at 40. 
 268. Id. at 127. 
 269. Id. at 140. 
 270. Id. 
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ing.271 Finally, capital defense attorneys can undermine jurors’ confidence in 
well-established schemas by making them aware of the unique legal conse-
quences of being wrong—dangers such as convicting the innocent, of not 
properly exercising mercy.272  
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have argued that our human instinct to empathize 
plays a key but underappreciated role in capital sentencing by helping jurors 
to evaluate mitigating evidence through intersubjective engagement with 
others such as defendants’ family members. I have also hypothesized that 
certain cultural stereotypes, in particular positive images of idealized White, 
middle-class family structures and negative images of dysfunctional Black 
family life, can distort or altogether derail these processes of empathic en-
gagement. Empirical research suggests that this warping effect actually oc-
curs, particularly where there are racial differences between capital jurors 
and capital defendants. Yet, this picture is still manifestly incomplete; more 
research is urgently needed in order to provide a more complete picture of 
how jurors’ potential understandings and usage of such constructions impact 
their assessments of whether defendants deserve to live or die. 
Fortunately, a number of strategies allow attorneys to actively combat 
the pernicious influence of stereotypes of family life: asking jurors to con-
front problematic perceptions, encouraging them to think of alternative pos-
sibilities, and utilizing jurors’ capacity for imagination. These tactics for 
combating negative family stereotypes confirm that our human instinct for 
empathic engagement, channeled through imagination, narrative, and story-
ing, simultaneously poses a threat to and extends the promise of immersive 
sociality and mercy. Thus, the process of understanding and perhaps extend-
ing empathy’s potential necessitates that capital defenders themselves be-
come not only its converts but its missionaries, for one should not preach a 
gospel to others without placing her faith in the same creeds.  
 
  
 271. Id. 
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